In summary
The German Federal Cartel Office (FCO) continues to be an active, sophisticated and efficient enforcement authority. Most cartel cases in Germany are still settled rather than appealed to the courts as both the FCO and undertakings aim to avoid lengthy and burdensome oral hearings. Undertakings may also rightly fear that their fine could be substantially increased by the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf (Appeals Court). Although there had been an overall trend of a decline in cases (and, hence, overall fines) over recent years, the enforcement seems to have picked up some speed since 2023–2024, with more than 18 dawn raids in 2023 and 11 in 2024 and several major antitrust proceedings being initiated. Some of the FCO's resources are likely to be used for the New Competition Tool introduced with the most recent, controversial amendment of the German Act against Restraints of Competition (GWB), and the 'taming of the Gatekeepers' under section 19a of the same.
Discussion points
- Trends in cartel enforcement in respect of the FCO, leniency, settlements and access to files
- Appeals Court proceedings and impact on undertakings' willingness to settle or appeal
- Liability of board members for costs caused by their cartel conduct towards the fined undertakings
- Actions taken against dawn raid court orders and whether the standard for obtaining search warrants is rising
- New Competition Tool introduced by 11th amendment of the GWB
- Labour market agreements in focus but no track record yet
Referenced in this article
- Aluminium Forging cartel proceeding
- Motorised Gardening Equipment proceeding
- Technical Building Services cartel proceedings: time limits for enforcement
- 11th amendment to the GWB
- Sehlbach case
The German Federal Cartel Office (FCO) remains a very active, efficient and sophisticated enforcement authority. It has proactively picked up various matters and has many times been a front runner in Europe with its enforcement policy. It operates in a legal setting where substantive and procedural laws are reviewed and amended regularly. There have been five fundamental reforms of the GWB since 2005, culminating in the 11th amendment (which came into force on 7 November 2023), whereas the draft for the 12th amendment never made it into the parliamentary reading before the governing coalition broke before end of term in November 2024. As far as cartels are concerned, the FCO has never used powers to order the disgorgement of economic benefits resulting from the violation of competition law for the difficulties of establishing the overcharge. The 11th amendment provides for a statutory presumption that a competition law infringement caused an economic benefit of at least 1 per cent of the turnover generated in Germany with the products connected to the infringement. The amount to be paid can reach 10 per cent of the total turnover of the undertaking in the fiscal year preceding the FCO's decision. This means that in Germany, cartel infringements may cost the undertaking up to 20 per cent of its annual turnover (a maximum 10 per cent fine plus a maximum 10 per cent disgorgement) plus damages to customers. Despite this, the new powers have not been used yet. The 11th amendment also strengthened the FCO's powers to investigate market sectors and to impose remedies, even in the absence of an infringement of competition law. A first proceeding has been initiated into mineral oil wholesaling.1 Previous rumours regarding the plan to remove the new powers from the array of instruments that the FCO may use have not been included in the new governing coalition's treaty.2
This article first presents some essential background information that is important to understand the overall enforcement framework, then touches on numbers and trends in fining decisions issued by the FCO and leniency applications. It highlights the most relevant cartel fine cases that have gone to appeal, and the status of judicature on the liability of board members for the company's cartel fines and damages.
Against the decline of leniency applications and cartel fines, the FCO is advocating to make leniency applications more attractive by reducing the risk of private follow-on damages claims. The FCO argues that this is necessary from the perspective of public enforcement, as leniency applications have, to some extent, become unpopular because of the increased risk of private damage claims. The FCO is even reflecting on whether to fully indemnify key witnesses from claims for damages caused by cartels.3 Furthermore, the FCO stated in its last annual reviews that part of the decline is a result of not having been able to conduct dawn raids and ex officio proceedings as efficiently during the pandemic. It has started to have a pipeline of cases and is increasingly relying on other tools for cartel detections such as whistle-blowing and, possibly, screening supported by artificial intelligence (AI).
Background: particularities of German cartel enforcement procedure
German cartel enforcement – under article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the German equivalent in section 1 of the GWB – follows the procedural rules of criminal enforcement. Other than the European Commission, the FCO needs to address (and may fine) at least one individual in a leading position who has either been participating in the cartel activity or has (negligently or intentionally) not fulfilled supervision obligations (instruction, organisation and control), thereby facilitating an infringement committed by an individual acting for or on behalf of the undertaking.
A fine can only be imposed if at least one individual's cartel conduct can be identified. In practice, the FCO fines between one and three individuals from the senior management of each company involved in misconduct (provided that their involvement can be proven) as well as the undertaking itself. The individual must have a certain degree of seniority (executive or senior management). This is usually no problem for the FCO as, for the most part, senior management is involved or has at least acted negligently in view of its active compliance management and surveillance obligations. Recently, the Appeals Court partly acquitted a company where the individual involved in the conduct did not fulfil the respective legal seniority criteria.4
If a company files for leniency, it usually includes those individuals who have acted for the company, thereby extending the leniency benefits to them. Any individual can, in principle, blow the whistle and request leniency just for themselves, although this rarely happens.
If the cartel activity concerns tenders, individuals involved are subject to criminal sanctions according to the Criminal Code, instead of just an administrative fine. In those types of cases, a leniency application will not relieve the individuals of pending criminal sanctions. However, an individual's contribution to the cooperation is likely to be taken into account as a mitigating circumstance when it comes to determining the criminal sanction for that individual. If an individual is to be criminally prosecuted, the FCO will go after the undertaking, and the criminal prosecution services will target the individual. Both authorities can work in parallel or consecutively; also on the level of investigation (ie, conducting dawn raids). An example is the Technical Building Services cartel, in which the FCO ended its proceedings by imposing fines on undertakings while the criminal proceedings pursued by the prosecution service in parallel against the individuals had not yet been concluded. In court proceedings, the FCO has the same rights as the prosecution service.
Infringement decisions of the FCO can only be contested in front of the Appeals Court's specialist cartel senates. Unlike the EU courts, the Appeals Court will not review whether the fining decision was justified and whether the competition authority has acted within the limits of its discretionary powers; rather, the Appeals Court will deal with the case under the general rules for criminal proceedings, and it must establish every single fact in a public hearing, including witness hearings.
Appeals Court trials are, therefore, quite burdensome on all parties; they usually take between 20 and 50 days in court; in extreme cases, they can take up more than 100 hearing days5 (former examples include 136 days in the Liquid Gas cartel).6 The length of such trials, combined with the possibility of the Appeals Court to impose a fine that is higher than the fine imposed by the FCO, has been a strong incentive for undertakings to settle with the FCO rather than to take the case to court or, when in court, to withdraw the appeal. A prominent example is the Beer cartel, in which the FCO imposed fines on six undertakings, amounting to a total of €336 million. Two undertakings appealed. One of them, Radeberger brewery, withdrew its appeal against a €154 million fine on the day before the hearing as it feared that its fine could soar to €1 billion should its appeal not succeed.7
Other than that, at some stage during a court proceeding, companies often choose – or feel compelled to choose – to end the proceeding by agreeing on a plea bargain. This 'deal' under German criminal procedural law allows the finding of a (typically less strict) verdict (eg, lower fine and sentence on a limited scope of wrongdoing), but it needs the consent of all parties involved in the court proceedings (ie, including the FCO and the public prosecutor).
In the following sections, we highlight a number of relevant cases, including some that are still pending. They illustrate the balance of power between undertakings and the FCO when negotiating settlements and deciding whether to appeal a case.
Proceedings and fines at FCO level: number crunching
The number of typical hardcore proceeding fines issued has decreased in recent years and remained at a fairly low level in 2024. The overall fines dropped from a total of €358 million in 2020 to only €105 million in 2021 (involving 11 undertakings),8 €24 million in 2022 (20 undertakings fined) and – an all-time low – €4.8 million in 2023 (involving eight undertakings). In 2024, the amount of fines slightly increased but still remained rather low at €19.4 million (involving only three undertakings).9
The FCO has explained the significant drop of the past years as a continued repercussion of the covid-19 pandemic, which has made the pursuit of cartels significantly more difficult.10 It emphasises that it enforced antitrust laws in other proceedings that have been closed with commitments and without fines, such as ending a cooperation of a working group negotiating jointly with public healthcare providers.11 The FCO believes, that the 'corona-dip' in cases should be over by now, expecting the number of future cases to grow. It should also not be forgotten that, at the same time, the FCO has spent a significant amount of its energy on pursuing the abuse of market power of the digital giants. Andreas Mundt, President of the FCO, also emphasised that several major antitrust proceedings have been initiated and are still ongoing and that more AI should be used in the future to further improve the detection of cartels.12
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The names of individuals fined and the amounts of the individual fines imposed on them are not published by the FCO. Hence, specific up-to-date data is not available. However, from the FCO's statistics as published from time to time, it can be established that, between 2011 and 2020, the FCO fined 302 individuals an overall amount of €23.6 million. The average fine imposed in that period amounted to approximately €80,000. An earlier FCO report had shown, however, that the highest fine imposed on a single individual between 2008 and 2015 had amounted to €800,000.13
The year 2024 did not see any spectacular new cases closed with particularly high fines by the FCO, such as the largest overall fine by far (€646 million), which was imposed on steel manufacturers for cartelising the production of quarto plates in 2019.14 The 2024 cases concerned only three undertakings (and one individual). The fines concerned companies in the fields of protective clothing, broadband devices and construction services.15 Two of the three cases focused on vertical price-fixing agreements, where only the manufacturer or head of the distribution system was fined.
Like many other antitrust authorities, the FCO offers a settlement bonus of 10 per cent. The vast majority of cases (virtually all that do not go on appeal) are, therefore, closed by way of settlement.
Owing to various factors, undertakings perceive the option not to settle as risky; particularly given that the Appeals Court, in a number of cases, has handed down fines that were substantially higher than those imposed before the FCO. Furthermore, a settlement decision is a relatively short text compared to a full-blown fining decision and may, therefore, provide less information for cartel damages claimants; hence, an undertaking will endeavour to appeal (and not settle) only if it considers that there is a substantial chance to escape the fine altogether (eg, because the statute of limitation has been exceeded, or because they feel that their involvement has not been proven or because they find the undisputed conduct not worthy of a fine). Finally, appealing a case will postpone the limitation period for damages claims, which is another deterring factor when considering an appeal on the amount of the fine.
Owing to the burden of the appeals procedure – which includes a large number of days in court – the FCO, in turn, has a strong incentive to settle so it can spend its resources on pursuing and fining (new) cartels rather than on defending its decisions in lengthy proceedings.
While an appeal to the Appeals Court may result in higher fines if the undertakings are found guilty, some recent cases have shown that the Appeals Court is also willing to side with undertakings on matters of substance.
Leniency: flattening the curve?
For two decades, the FCO has employed a leniency programme (launched in 2000 and overhauled in 2006). Private practitioners have frequently criticised the somewhat opaque practice that differs from case to case, depending on which unit within the FCO deals with the case, while also praising the flexibility of the FCO.
In some cases, even leniency applications submitted after dawn raids have led to comparatively high reductions. This has triggered speculation that the FCO may have wanted to deliberately discourage perpetrators from seeking refuge with the Appeals Court and instead enter into a settlement, thereby closing the case at that stage. This type of speculation may or may not have grounds; however, undertakings that have simply done their best to reduce their fine will certainly not complain, and the FCO legitimately has no interest in having its resources tied up by many days in court.
In some respects, the amendment of the law in 2021 leads to a higher degree of legal certainty for leniency applicants as the cornerstones of the leniency programme – including the possibility of requesting a marker (section 81m of the GWB) – have been incorporated into the law, thereby making them binding on the Appeals Court, too.16 For a time after 2011, the number of leniency applications to the FCO steadily increased over the years, peaking in 2015 (76 applications); however, since then, it has been decreasing: 59 in 2016; 37 in 2017; 21 in 2018; 16 in 2019; 13 in 2020; nine in 2021; 13 in 2022; and 11 in 2023.17 The FCO's annual review for 2024 shows that there was a slight increase in the number of leniency applications that year.18 However, the number remained relatively low at only 17 applications. Hence, sources such as Whistleblowing Hotlines (such as that created under the Whistleblower Protection Act (HinSchG)) of 2023 (based on the Directive (EU) 2019/1937 (Whistleblower Directive) have in recent years overtaken the leniency programme as the chief source of information for cartel fine proceedings. Two of the three FCO cartel proceedings that ended with a fine in 2024 were a result of anonymous tip-offs.19
The lowest figure, in 2021, was probably caused by the covid-19 pandemic, during which companies may have focused on other issues (ie, less on internal investigations and compliance measures, which typically lead to a disclosure of misconduct and subsequent leniency applications). Furthermore, it must be taken into account that while dawn raids may have been triggered by leniency applications, a significant number of the leniency applications in the past have been follow-on applications after or during a dawn raid. In other words, the sinking number of dawn raids is likely to have contributed to the low number of overall leniency applications.
However, there is surely a connection with the trend of rapidly increasing numbers of private damages claims in ever-increasing amounts that are burdensome and costly to defend. Those were sparked by legal amendments in 2005, 2009 and 2017, one being the rule that in a damages action, a civil court may not question whether a company participated in an antitrust infringement if the FCO has held so. As previously mentioned, this development has led the FCO's president, Andreas Mundt, to raise the question of how to make leniency more attractive again for the whistle-blower; possibly by providing the first leniency applicant with more than just an exemption from a cartel fine (eg, by granting further benefits, particularly through protection from follow-on damages claims).20 That said, it remains to be seen if this is a turning point with a (significant) increase in leniency applications in the future.
While the FCO will not disclose leniency applications and accompanying material to third parties pursuing damages claims against cartelists, the authority will hand out infringement decisions. The decisions may be relatively short (with often only a couple of pages describing the infringement) if an undertaking enters into a settlement with the FCO. If there is no settlement, the decisions are much longer and contain much more information about the infringement; however, whether that information is helpful to prove the claim (in particular, to quantify damages) is a different matter.
The number of applications to the FCO to disclose infringement decisions has risen significantly in the past few years. While parliament has laid the legal basis for damaged parties in 2017 to claim information from cartelists, leaving access to the FCO's files only as a last resort, it had been a matter of dispute whether this new rule applies only to damages actions that are based on infringements that occurred after 27 December 2016. The 10th amendment to the GWB in 2021 clarified that this rule shall also apply to infringements committed before that date.
Appeal of decisions imposing fines: no risk, no fun?
During the past few years, a minority of the FCO decisions that imposed fines have been appealed to the Appeals Court, which, after conducting its own proceedings, handed down substantially higher fines in various cases. This reformatio in peius is compliant with German constitutional law and stems from the specific German procedural system, according to which the Appeals Court assesses all facts of the case from scratch and decides on a possible fine independently of the fine imposed by the FCO. In recent hearings, district attorneys almost always requested that fines be set significantly higher than in the original FCO decision. Those decisions of the Appeals Court increasing the fines to such an extent have been widely (and harshly) criticised by the industry and private practice as they have been perceived to de facto deter companies from appealing against the FCO's fine decisions (and, at an earlier stage, urge them into settlement agreements with the authority or to, later on, withdraw the appeal).
However, meanwhile the picture has changed and appeals have become more common again. The Appeals Court and the German Federal Court of Justice (FCJ) – the last national instance in cartel proceedings – have in recent times also significantly reduced fines or even acquitted the accused (eg, for not being able to confirm that the infringement ever happened).21 At the same time, the FCJ has also sent cases back to the Appeals Court where it found the Appeals Court had wrongly sided with the applicants. Those cases have been sent back to a different chamber at the Appeals Court. In many of those cases, the Appeals Court lowered the fine compared to the FCO decision in the second (again full) trial except for the Rossmann case, where the fine was lowered compared to the first decision of the Appeals Court, but still remained significantly higher than the original FCO fine.
Famous decisions that have led to significantly higher fines imposed by the Appeals Court than those imposed by the FCO include those set out in the table below. Where applicable, the ultimate outcome after the appeal to the FCJ and second decision of the Appeals Court are stipulated in the third column:
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Cases in which the fines have been either lowered or cancelled by the Appeals Court include the following – some of these reductions have, however, not been confirmed by the FCJ – and have been sent back to a different chamber of the Appeals Court for a new (full) trial:
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Those developments show that appeals to cartel proceedings are alive and kicking in Germany.
More recent highlight cases – some of them still pending – are discussed further below in more detail.
Moreover, whereas the FCO has issued (self-binding) guidelines for the setting of fines, the Appeals Court is not bound by them and only has to take into account that fines cannot exceed 10 per cent of the company's group global turnover. Criticism has been voiced to the effect that appealing a fine decision would bring a systemic change of the calculation of the fine and, therefore, automatically lead to its increase.
A provision introduced to the GWB in 2021 explicitly specifies that – as in EU law and prior case law – the gravity and duration of the infringement must be taken into account when determining the amount of the fine. Furthermore, other factors are to be taken into account, such as the effects of the infringement and (for the first time) compliance efforts pre- and post-infringement, which is an important change.
The provisions still leave wide discretion for the courts. The FCO revised its fining guidelines, taking into account the new rules.28 The FCO has, in particular, confirmed that its future approach will take greater account of the practice of the German courts in that a reference value will be determined based on the turnover linked to the infringement and the size of the company. In a press release, the FCO has stated that future guidelines will ultimately 'create more flexibility in the individual case but no essential change in the level of fines is expected'. Notwithstanding the amended guidelines, substantial uncertainties remain.
STIHL case (vertical non-compete)
In August 2024, the Appeals Court quashed an FCO decision, in which the FCO had determined the unlawfulness of a non-compete clause used by STIHL for distribution agreements with authorised STIHL dealers.29 STIHL operated a selective distribution agreement system, in which it differentiated between 'regular' STIHL dealers on one hand and those with the status of 'STIHL Service Dealer' on the other. The 'STIHL Service' status was particularly privileged because of specific conditions that offered advantages over 'regular' STIHL dealers, making it attractive to many dealers. Until 2021, all STIHL Service Dealers were required to sign the STIHL Service Additional Agreement, in addition to the STIHL Dealer Agreement, which included a non-compete clause. As a result, STIHL Service Dealers were not allowed to sell products from other manufacturers alongside STIHL for certain products. The non-compete clause of the STIHL Service Additional Agreement was applied by STIHL until June 2021. The FCO launched proceedings against STIHL in October 2020 after one of STIHL's competitors had filed a complaint concerning the use of the non-compete clause by STIHL.30
In May 2022, the FCO declared that the non-compete clause created a barrier to market entry for competitors of STIHL. The FCO, thus, declared the non-compete clause to be a violation of section 1 GWB and article 101 TFEU. This case was peculiar because STIHL had ceased using the clause a year prior to the decision by the FCO. The FCO justified the need for this post facto determination because of the deterrent effect it could have on other distribution contracts.31 It did not impose a fine, though. However, the FCO warned that similar violations of antitrust law would be sanctioned in the future.
The Appeals Court disagreed with the finding of the FCO.32 It did not find a violation of either article 101 TFEU or section 1 GWB. According to the court's ruling, the non-compete clause did not constitute an appreciable restriction of competition within the meaning of article 101 (1) TFEU and section 1 GWB, even though STIHL's market share in different segments was well above 30 per cent, wherefore the contracts would not have qualified for block exemption. The court inter alia examined whether the non-compete clause could violate article 101 (1) TFEU or section 1 GWB as a result of its duration. It held that when determining whether a non-compete clause was agreed for an unreasonably long duration, the legal and factual circumstances at the time of contract conclusion must be considered. Therefore, the competitive conditions at the time the agreement was made are crucial. In the present case, the agreement was concluded in 2016. Hence, the conditions in 2016 were relevant, and not those of 2019 or 2020, on which the FCO based its contested decision. However, at no point during the proceedings had the FCO investigated the competitive conditions in 2016.
The court could find no evidence that the non-compete clause had as its effect an appreciable restriction of competition. It stated that in assessing the contribution of a non-compete clause to setting up market entry barriers, the market share was just one of many factors to consider. Other relevant factors include the number of dealers bound by the non-compete clause in relation to the number of unbound dealers, the duration of the non-compete clause, the volume affected by the non-compete clause as well as the ratio of the affected volume to the unaffected volume. However, the FCO failed to consider the relevant other factors in its decision. The Appeals Court held that the FCO considered only STIHL's total market share and concluded that neither the conditions for a block exemption nor the conditions for a de minimis exemption were met. According to the court, the FCO also failed to take into account the conditions established in case law for examining the anticompetitive effect of exclusive purchasing agreements or corresponding non-compete clauses in vertical contracts. Specifically, it did not determine the buyer percentage bound by the non-compete clause with respect to market shares on the one hand and sales outlets on the other. In the court's view, this analysis was insufficient and did not justify a violation of section 1 GWB or article 101 TFEU.
The court explained that in order for a non-compete clause to significantly influence market access opportunities, it is generally required that the supplier holds a market share above the threshold of presumed market dominance of 40 per cent according to section 18(4) GWB, and that the percentage of buyers bound by the non-compete clause, both in terms of market share and sales outlets, exceeds 30 per cent. However, the court clarified that it is not enough for the non-compete clause to significantly impact market entry. A violation of article 101(1) TFEU and section 1 GWB requires the existence of additional barriers to market entry of considerable significance. From 10 possible market segments identified by the court, the court found that STIHL's non-complete clause only significantly affected the markets for chainsaws and for earth augers. Only in these markets did STIHL have market shares above the presumed market dominance threshold of 40 per cent under section 18(4) GWB and the percentage of the market share bound exceeded 30 per cent. Even in these two product markets, the percentage of buyers bound by the non-compete clause with respect to the tied sales outlets was only 12 per cent (1,177 sales outlets out of a total of 10,197 outlets were bound by the non-compete clause), and with respect to companies bound, it was at most 23 per cent (906 from a total of 4,000). On the other market segments covered by the non-compete clause, the undertaking's market shares were – partially significantly – below 40 per cent, and the percentages of the market volume bound were – partially significantly – below 30 per cent. However, even in the markets for chainsaws and earth augers, the significant impact on market entry did not rise to the level of a violation of article 101(1) TFEU and section 1 GWB as additional barriers to market entry of considerable significance were not present. The court mentioned specifically the low percentage of sales outlets and companies bound by the non-compete clause.
Aluminium Forging cartel
The Aluminium Forging case is an example of a spectacular fine reduction by the Appeals Court. The FCO initially imposed fines totalling around €175 million in December 2020 on the undertakings involved in the cartel.33 The companies met as the 'Aluminium Forging Group' between April 2006 and April 2018. In addition to regularly exchanging information on procurement costs and increased aluminium and energy costs, the undertakings also agreed to pass on their procurement costs and cost increases to their respective customers.
Two of the companies involved, Otto Fuchs Beteiligungen and Leiber Group, chose to appeal the FCO decision. Otto Fuchs' share of the fine amounted to €145 million, while the FCO levied the Leiber Group with a fine of about €7 million. On appeal, the Appeals Court fined Otto Fuchs around €30 million, a reduction of €115 million compared to the original fine by the FCO. The court took into account a number of factors in assessing the fine. In addition to the infrequent nature of the information exchange, the court found that the information was also not concrete.34 Furthermore, the court considered the relatively low potential for damage and profit owing to the fact that the pricing elements that were discussed only affected a small proportion of total costs. The Appeals Court also weighed the fact that the companies involved found themselves in a 'sandwich position' between aluminium suppliers and car manufacturers, which put them under 'significant negotiating pressure'. For Otto Fuchs, the discrepancy between the fines levied by the FCO and the Appeals Court is proof of the 'inappropriate and disproportionate approach' taken by the FCO. The FCO for its part has decided to appeal the decision of the Appeals Court. A decision by the FCJ is still pending.
The decision to appeal the decision of the FCO also paid off for the Leiber Group.35 In its case, the fine set by the Appeals Court was around 80 per cent lower than the amount originally imposed by the FCO. The Appeals Court not only handed down a substantially lower fine, the Leiber Group also reached a plea bargain with the FCO for a reduction of the charges. As a result, the charge of direct price agreements was dropped. Nonetheless, the exchange of information between the companies was still deemed a violation of antitrust law.
Technical Building Services cartel
On the appeal of one undertaking fined and after 22 days of oral hearing, the second senate of the Appeals Court confirmed only part of the fine that had been imposed by the FCO on a member of the Technical Building Services cartel.36 In December 2019, the FCO had fined the appellant €47.5 million for having cartelised in seven instances bids for technical building services. The second senate, however, imposed a fine in the amount of €21 million (ie, less than half of the amount the FCO had deemed right). In one instance of conduct fined by the FCO, the Appeals Court acquitted the appellant based on the circumstance that the employee participating in the cartel did not fulfil the seniority criteria stipulated by German law for attributing the individual's conduct to the appellant. This appears to be one of the rare cases where the German-specific cartel fining system actually made a difference compared to the principles of EU antitrust law, where any employee conduct would be attributed to the undertaking.
For the most part, the reduction was because the second senate considered part of the offence to be time-barred. The senate aligned its jurisprudence on limitation periods in a bid-rigging cartel with that of the European Court of Justice (ECJ),37 according to which the cartel ends and the limitation period begins at least for the party losing the bid with the submission of the final (cartelised) bid. It thereby deviated from the FCJ's view expressed in a case decided shortly before the respective ECJ decision. According to the FCJ decision, the limitation period does not start from the conclusion of the contract but only from the complete execution of the contract (ie, when the final invoice is issued).38
However, the FCJ ruled in September 2024 to overturn this decision in part and to refer the case back to the Appeals Court.39 The FCJ confirmed its earlier ruling in 2020 in which it held that the limitation period only begins with the complete execution of the contract. The court ruled that this was not contrary to EU law because the sanctioning of cartel offences by the enforcement authorities of the member states is governed solely by the respective national procedural law and not by EU law. According to the court, the earlier ruling by the ECJ does not warrant a different assessment because it dealt solely with the commencement of the limitation period in procedures under EU law.
This ruling is highly relevant for undertakings involved in bid rigging. Such undertakings must now (again) expect that the FCO will also investigate bid-rigging agreements that occurred a long time ago, provided the final invoice was issued less than five years ago. Especially in the case of large projects, where there may be several years between the agreement or the resulting contract conclusion and the final invoice, the ruling of the FCJ leads to a significantly longer risk of prosecution of such acts under German law than would be the case under EU law.
Do cartelising managers have to compensate companies' fines and damages?
The question of whether members of the board are liable to the company for fines and lawyers' fees incurred by the company as a consequence of the company's antitrust law violation is still under a lot of discussion. In previous editions, we reported on the first-ever judgment of a German civil court that aimed to provide answers to this question.40
Long before that case was dealt with in court, a claim for manager liability was filed in the aftermath of another cartel: in 2012, the FCO imposed a fine on ThyssenKrupp (approximately €191 million) for participating in the Railtrack cartel. Faced with a number of damages claims, ThyssenKrupp agreed to settlements (eg, with the state-owned railway operator Deutsche Bahn for an amount of approximately €100 million). In 2014, ThyssenKrupp started an action for damages, amounting to approximately €300 million, against former members of the executive board allegedly involved in the cartel (known as the Sehlbach case). Proceedings before various courts dragged on for eight years and, according to media reports, came to an end in January 2022. Reportedly, in an out-of-court settlement, liability insurers, led by Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty and IAG, paid a double-digit million-euro amount. The exact figures are not publicly known, but it is said that the settlement was for less than 10 per cent of the amount claimed (ie, less than €30 million). According to reports, the managers did not need to contribute to that amount. Hence, the case has not created a precedent for further cases to come – but its outcome is probably not encouraging for companies who would like to see the employees participating in the cartel to bear at least part of the cartel fine and other damages.
However, it is possible that this issue could be finally decided in the near future in a different case. On 27 July 2023, the Appeals Court also dealt with the question of whether board members or managing directors are liable to the company for fines and legal fees.41 It denied liability for the fines imposed and agreed on this with the lower court (Düsseldorf Regional Court).42 The Appeals Court essentially argued that a recourse for damages would undermine the purpose of a fine on the company. According to the Appeals Court, the legislator wanted to impose the sanction specifically on the company and not on a natural person. The parties appealed the ruling of the Appeals Court to the FCJ, which suspended proceedings and petitioned the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.43 The FCJ is inclined to find that German law does not prevent companies from seeking redress from its cartelising managers. Therefore, the FCJ's request for a preliminary ruling concerns the question of whether provisions of German law allowing liability of managers for cartel fines imposed on the undertaking are compatible with article 101 TFEU and the principle of effet utile. At the heart of the matter is the question of whether fines for antitrust violations will remain sufficiently effective and serve as a deterrent if companies can pass on the fines to the directors' and officers' (D&O) insurance companies.44 (In practice, it seems that it would be difficult to find a D&O that insured intentional conduct.)
Other courts have decided to stay proceedings to await the outcome of the decisions of the FCJ (and now ultimately the ECJ). Only one month after the decision of the Appeals Court, the Regional Court of Dortmund (decision of 14 August 2023) expressly took a different view from the Appeals Court (which is its appeal court) and decided to suspend its judgment until the FCJ would decide the appeal to the Appeals Court judgment.
Dawn raid orders in court
In 2023 and 2024, several companies (copper cable producers) took court action against dawn raid orders of the District Court of Bonn (the court where the FCO is seated and where the FCO requests for search warrants to be issued).
In 2023, the 14th chamber of the Regional Court of Bonn (appeal instance) found the search warrants of the District Court of Bonn to be flawed (in essence, as they lacked precise, specific and uncontradicted factual evidence that could be the basis of an 'initial suspicion': the procedural prerequisite of a search warrant under German law).
However, at the beginning of 2024, the competence for administrative offence proceedings shifted to the 12th chamber of the Regional Court of Bonn. This chamber, in turn, then decided on other appeals in the copper cable proceedings and held the appeals to be unfounded. In particular, the 12th chamber was more willing to acknowledge an initial suspicion in constellations where the suspicion was based on (at least some) concrete facts (instead of vague indications or mere assumptions).45 In particular, the court did not follow the complainant's argument that European Union law (here the ECN+ Directive 2019/01, which indicates that 'reasonable grounds for suspecting an infringement'46 are required) would demand a higher degree of suspicion or proof of wrongdoing than the German standard.47 The new practice of the 12th chamber of the Regional Court of Bonn also seems to deviate from the European Union courts' case law, which holds that there must be sufficiently serious circumstantial evidence ('sufficiently serious indicia') for a search warrant to suspect an infringement of competition law.48
The 12th chamber of the Regional Court of Bonn has also issued similar decisions in 2025 in other proceedings.49
This new trend in case law can be interpreted as fostering the FCO's and the District Court of Bonn's practice of being less strict on the level of issuing search warrants. There is surely criticism of this approach, as some voices argue that the disruptive impact of dawn raids for companies is not sufficiently taken into consideration (threat of reputation loss, cost incurred, psychological burden for persons involved, etc.). Yet, companies will need to take into consideration that the FCO can and will conduct dawn raids more frequently.
Access to the file
In recent years, German courts have dealt with multiple cases pertaining to the issue of access to the file. In March 2023, the Regional Court of Bonn decided to postpone a judgment in a case concerning the legality of multiple court orders authorising dawn raids. The court said that a decision had to be deferred till the company was granted access to the relevant files. According to the court, the principle of equality of arms requires that the company has access to all the files it needs to effectively challenge the legality of the measure.50 It made reference to a ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court in 2007.51 In that decision, the Federal Constitutional Court held that a decision on an appeal could not be reached against an applicant until the applicant has been granted access to the files and has had the opportunity to present its case. The regional court found that the principle of equality of arms cannot be guaranteed without access to the case files. The FCO had cited the endangerment of future investigations as a justification for denying access to the case files. According to the court, this was too general and not substantiated by concrete indications. While the court recognised a threat to the investigative purpose as an exemption from the right of access to the file, it set a high bar for the fulfilment of this exemption. According to the court, a threat to the investigative purpose requires objective indications, supported by factual evidence, that the accused will unlawfully interfere with the investigation if granted access to the files. Even then, access to the files can only be completely denied if the risk to the investigation cannot be sufficiently minimised by withholding only parts of the files. The conclusion of the court was that the FCO had not met the requirements for the exemption.
In the STIHL case, the Appeals Court ruled against the FCO's decision to deny STIHL access to the (full) files (see STIHL case, above). The Court held that the FCO violated the company's right to be heard under section 56(1) GWB and its right to access files under section 56(3) GWB by initially failing to disclose the market share tables for 2020 and by not disclosing STIHL's exact market shares and market volumes in the evaluation tables for the market shares of 2019 and 2020.52 Instead, the FCO had only provided STIHL with a range between 30 and 40 per cent. According to the Court, knowledge of the exact market shares was necessary in order for STIHL to assess the basis of the FCO's decision. This was the only way the company could be placed in a position to understand whether the market shares determined by the FCO were correct and whether, and to what extent, the market share thresholds deemed relevant by the FCO were reached or exceeded. The Appeals Court also ruled that none of the exemptions to the general rule of access to the file were applicable in this case. The withholding of the exact market shares was neither necessary to protect the business and trade secrets of STIHL, nor did it serve the protection of trade and business secrets of the company's competitors.53
The right to access the file also played a prominent role in two cases involving tech giants under article 19a GWB. While those are not classic cartel cases, the principles of access to the file by the undertakings concerned are the same for all proceedings led by the FCO, wherefore these decisions would also apply to cartel proceedings.
In its judgment of April 2024 concerning Amazon's status as an undertaking of paramount significance within the meaning of section 19a GWB, the FCJ ruled that the FCO had not illegally withheld data from Amazon.54 The FCO refused to grant Amazon access to the raw data of a survey of companies it conducted, fearing Amazon would be able to deduce the identities of the participants of the survey. The FCO argued that the protection of trade and business secrets of the companies surveyed necessitated the withholding of the raw data. The FCJ sided with the FCO. According to the court, Amazon failed to establish how access to the raw data was necessary to ensure Amazon's right to be heard or its right to effective legal protection.
In another section 19a case, this time involving Google, the FCJ weighed in on the FCO's decision to leave some passages of its planned order unredacted. Google claimed that the passages needed to be redacted in order to protect its trade and business secrets. At issue before the FCJ were a total of nine passages. In the end, the FCJ ruled that only one of the passages needed to be redacted. In the other instances, the court found that the FCO was authorised to disclose trade and business secrets. It stated that the disclosure had to be proportional, suitable and necessary for the furtherance of the investigations being conducted by the FCO. In addition, the public interest in promoting the proceedings had to outweigh the confidentiality interests of the company involved. The FCJ found that these conditions were met.
Competition register
By setting up the competition register in 2021, the FCO created a digital database that allows over 30,000 contracting authorities in Germany (ie, buyers that are controlled by the state) to obtain information about breaches of competition law and other economic offences by bidders before awarding a contract, and to exclude offenders from the contract-awarding process. Since June 2022, things have become serious for companies. Before the award of a contract worth €30,000 or more, each contracting authority is obliged to enquire with the competition register. The FCO reports for 2024 that around 19,000 economic offences (ie, approximately five times as many as in 2022) have been registered, while up to 1,100 requests per day have been made by contracting authorities.55 For this reason, companies that were found to have infringed competition law have already engaged in 'self-purification', in particular by implementing compliance measures (such as compliance management systems), and have engaged in compensation for damages. This is – and will be – necessary to be removed from the register's 'wall of shame'.
11th Amendment Bill facilitates skimming-off profits (disgorgements)
The 11th Amendment Bill, which entered into force on 7 November 2023, entails two major amendments.56
The first follows an idea similar to the European Union's plans for a New Competition Tool: it allows the FCO to order any effective and proportionate measure (including as a last resort unbundling) on any dysfunctional market without having to prove a violation of antitrust laws.57 This amendment makes certain activities easier for the antitrust authorities and possibly encourages them to use this tool rather than to undertake the difficult task of proving an antitrust violation.
The second empowers the FCO to require undertakings to pay a maximum of 10 per cent disgorgements of their group turnover for antitrust law infringements; this would come on top of fines and, therefore, would increase the cost of an antitrust violation to 20 per cent of group turnover plus, of course, damages.
Provisions on disgorgement in the GWB can be traced back to 1980. To date, the FCO has not passed an order on that basis. There is only one case reported in which the cartel authority of the Federal State of Hesse used this provision against excessive water prices charged by a municipal utility.
An important amendment is that a legal presumption has been introduced that the economic benefit amounts to at least 1 per cent of the turnover that the undertaking achieved in Germany with products and services linked to the infringement.
A 'benefit' or an 'advantage' does not necessarily mean the same as damage. In the legal sense, damage is an involuntary loss of assets. The difference between benefits and damages may well be illustrated by the decision of the FCO to prohibit Facebook from combining user data from different sources (Facebook, WhatsApp and Instagram), as this was considered an abuse of market power. As Facebook, etc, are financed completely by advertising, Facebook, by committing the abuse, does not reduce users' assets. Users, therefore, do not suffer monetary damages for which they could sue Facebook. However, Facebook is likely to gain an economic advantage from the pooling of data because it can optimise the products it sells on the advertising market. If Facebook could generate higher advertising sales as a result of the infringement, this could be an advantage the cartel authorities will be able to withdraw.
Labour market agreements: Appeals Court considers minimum wage agreements for freelance journalists a by-object restriction
While antitrust enforcers around the globe, and sometimes the legislature, have identified restrictions of competition in labour markets (basically wage-fixing and no-poach agreements) as the new hot topic, the FCO is still waiting for its first case. Previously, the FCO could gather experience only in assisting the European Commission in raiding the Germany-based Delivery Hero. The European Commission investigates whether Delivery Hero and its competitor at that time, Glovo, participated in a cartel in the sector of online ordering and delivery of food, groceries and other daily consumer goods. Delivery Hero and Glovo are suspected to have agreed, among other things, not to poach each other's employees.58 The FCO's president, Andreas Mundt, in an interview with Global Competition Review on 3 January 2025 said it 'is a bit of a miracle to me' that 'we do not have a single case in Germany' and 'we would like to look at these cases'.59
The circumstances of a judgment of the regional Court of Appeals of Celle are rather peculiar:60 the association of German newspaper publishers and two unions representing employed and freelance journalists had agreed on rules for minimum compensation of freelance journalists. This agreement was concluded with reference to the German copyright act. This act provides that an author has a claim to equitable remuneration for the granting of rights of use, and that a remuneration determined according to a common remuneration rule is indisputably equitable. The agreement of the publisher association and the unions therefore established criteria for the appropriateness of compensation in the contracts between full-time freelance journalists and publishers. This minimum compensation agreement did not concern employees but rather those who are self-employed, a feature very common in the gig economy (so, strictly speaking, it did not concern labour markets). The appeals court held that the agreement, though concluded to secure an appropriate (ie, minimum) remuneration of freelance journalists, constituted a restriction of competition by object. However, the court expressly left open and did not elaborate on whether this restriction of competition was justified (ie, exempted from the cartel prohibition), as it was able to come to its judgment without determining this issue and without having to base its judgment on competition law rules.
As long as there is no decision by a court or by the FCO, antitrust practitioners in Germany refer to the European Commission's policy brief 'Antitrust in Labour Markets' of May 2024, which considers wage-fixing agreement by object restriction and no-poach agreements, as a rule, likewise.61 However, this does not mean a per se violation of competition law. It is still possible for companies to argue that their agreement is beneficial to competition. For naked wage-fixing and no-poach agreements, it is hard to see how such an argument can be successful. However, in other circumstances such an argument can be perfectly reasonable, as such agreements, in an individual case, may be well qualified to be ancillary restraints. This may be the case, for example, when no-poach agreements are to protect a joint venture from a controlling shareholder taking advantage of their position and snatching away the best employees, or to protect an acquirer of an undertaking from competition by the seller for a limited post-M&A period. In any event, even legitimate no-poach agreements must be restricted to the absolutely necessary.
Footnotes
1. Federal Cartel Office (FCO), press release, 'Bundeskartellamt examines significant malfunctioning of competition in the wholesale of fuels – first proceeding based on new competition tool' (6 March 2025), https://www.bundeskartellamt.de /SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2025/03_06_2025_Proceeding_32f.html?nn=52004.
2. 'Politikwechsel für Deutschland – Wahlprogramm von CDU und CSU', p. 17, https://www.cdu.de/app/uploads/2025/01/km_btw_2025_wahlprogramm_langfassung_ansicht.pdf; 'Statement des CorA-Netzwerks für Unternehmensverantwortung zu den Koalitionsverhandlungen' (31 March 2025), https://www.fian.de/aktuelles/statement-des-cora-netzwerks-fuer-unternehmensverantwortung-zu-den-koalitionsverhandlungen/; 'Ministerial override on mergers has failed, Germany's Mundt says', MLex (2 April 2025).
3. Drößler, Paul: 'Renaissance der Kartelljäger: Das Ende weiterer Privilegien für Kronzeugen?' (NZKart 2024, 1).
4. See below: 'Technical Building Services cartel proceedings'.
5. Ost/Breuer, NZKart 2019, p. 119 et seq.
6. 'Bußen falsch berechnet: OLG Düsseldorf muss Verfahren gegen Flüssiggaskartellanten neu aufrollen', Juve (29 January 2019).
7. 'Bierkartell: Carlsberg kämpft mit Baker, Radeberger kapituliert mit Mütze Korsch', Juve (13 June 2018).
8. Bundeskartellamt – Review of 2021, https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs /Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2021/22_12_2021_Jahresrueckblick.html.
9. FCO, press release, 'Review of 2024' (19 December 2024).
10. FCO, press release, 'Review of 2023' (21 December 2023).
11. ibid.
12. FCO, press release, 'Review of 2024' (19 December 2024).
13. Tätigkeitsbericht des Bundeskartellamtes 2015/2016, for the period of 2008–2015, pp. 32–34.
14. FCO, press release, 'Steel manufacturers fined approx. €646 million for agreeing on prices of quarto plates' (12 December 2019).
15. FCO, press release, 'Review of 2024' (19 December 2024).
16. FCO, press release, 'Bundeskartellamt publishes new guidelines on its leniency programme and the setting of fines' (11 October 2021), https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN /Pressemitteilungen/2021/11_10_2021_Guidelines_Liniency.html?nn=3591568.
17. FCO, press release, 'Bundeskartellamt – Review of 2023' (21 December 2023), https://www.bundeskartellamt.de /SharedDocs/Meldung /EN/Pressemitteilungen/2023/21_12_2023_Jahresr%C3%BCckblick.html.
18. FCO. press release, 'Review of 2024' (19 December 2024), https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung /EN/Pressemitteilungen/2024/19_12_2024_Jahresr%C3%BCckblick.html.
19. cf. FCO, press release, 'Fine imposed on Strabag AG for collusive tendering in relation to renovation of Cologne's Zoobrücke bridge' (6 November 2024); FCO, press release, 'Bundeskartellamt imposes fine against Fritz! brand products manufacturer AVM' (2 July 2024).
20. 'Mehr Schutz für Kronzeugen?', LTO (3 January 2022), https://www.lto.de/recht/nachrichten/n/bundeskartellam-kronzeugen-regelung-kein-schadensersatz-besserer-schutz-kartelle-aufdecken.
21. Ost/Breuer, NZKart 2019, p. 119 et seq. (the authors from the FCO underline that fine reductions had gone unnoticed).
22. cf. FCO, press release, 'Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court increases fines against liquefied gas cartel' (16 April 2013); 'Mammutverfahren endlich abgeschlossen', Juve (7 October 2020).
23. 'Tapetenkartell: Gericht erhöht Bußgelder für Mandanten von Hengeler und Gibson Dunn', Juve (17 October 2017); judgment final and binding (see Bundeskartellamt Tätigkeitsbericht(FCO activity report) 2019/2020, p. 75).
24. 'Informationsaustausch: OLG erhöht Bußgelder im Süßwarenkartell', Juve (6 February 2017).
25. 'OLG Düsseldorf: Höhere Kartellbußgelder für Süßwarenhersteller', Beck-aktuell (27 January 2017), https://rsw.beck.de/aktuell/daily /meldung/detail /olg-duesseldorf-rueckendeckung-fuer-bundeskartellamt-im-streit-mit-suesswarenherstellern.
26. '"Süßwarenkartell": Höhe der Geldbußen steht fest', Beck-aktuell (20 December 2023), https://rsw.beck.de/aktuell/daily/meldung /detail/suesswarenkartell-geldbussen-Bahlsen-de-Beukelaer.
27. For the saga of these proceedings, see https://globalcompetitionreview.com/review/the-european-middle-east-and-african-antitrust-review/2025/article/germany-ex-officio-enforcement-stays-vigilant-while-number-of-leniency-applications-remains-low#:~:text=case%20is%20pending.-,Rossmann%20case,-Th.
28.See FCO, 'Guidelines for the setting of fines in cartel administrative offence proceedings' (11 October 2021), https://www.bundeskartellamt.de /SharedDocs /Publikation/EN/Leitlinien/Guidelines_setting_fines_Oct_2021.html?nn=3591500.
29. Bundeskartellamt Pressemeldung, Fallbericht: Kartellrechtswidriges Wettbewerbsverbot in Vertriebsvereinbarungen von Motorsägen-Hersteller STIHL nachträglich festgestellt (Entscheidung vom 31. Mai 2022) (29 June 2022).
30. Bundeskartellamt Fallbericht: Bundeskartellamt stellt Kartellrechtswidrigkeit des Wettbewerbsverbots in Vertriebsvereinbarungen von Motorsägen-Hersteller STIHL nachträglich fest B5-130/20 (29 June 2022).
31. 'Erst abgesägt, dann abgesegnet – die STIHL-Wettbewerbsverbote', Kümmerlein (27 January 2025).
32. Beschluss vom Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, Kart 4/22 (V).
33. FCO, press release, 'Fines imposed on aluminium forging companies on account of anti-competitive agreements' (23 December 2020).
34. Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, press release No. 11/2025, https://www.olg-duesseldorf.nrw.de/behoerde/presse/Presse_aktuell/20250305_PM__Aluminium-Schmieden_-Urteil/index.php; see also https://content.mlex.com/#/content/1636122/otto-fuchs-scores-big-cartel-fine-reduction-at-german-court-update?referrer=search_linkclick.
35. 'Menold Bezler und Kartellamt schmieden Einigung im Aluminiumkartell', Juve (5 February 2025).
36.Judgment of 11 November 2022, Case No. V-2 Kart 2/20; see Appeals Court, press release No. 30/2022.
37. ECJ, Judgment of 14 January 2021, Case No. C 450/19.
38. With regard to FCJ, Decision No. KRB 25/20 of 25 August 2020: Luther, 'ECJ defines end of bid-rigging cartels and limits of enforcement' (29 January 2021).
39. Judgment of 17 September 2024, BGH, Case No. KRB 101/23, NZKart 2025, p. 31.
40.Judgment of 15 September 2020, LG Saarbrücken, Case No. 7 HK O 6/16, CB 2020, p. 79 et seq. with annotation by Borbála Dux-Wenzel and Helmut Janssen, https://www.luther-lawfirm.com/fileadmin/user_upload/CB_03_21_Dux_Wenzel_Janssen.pdf.
41. Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, 6 U 1/22 (Kart).
42. Landgericht Düsseldorf, 37 O 66/20 [Kart].
43. 'Vorstandshaftung im Stahlkartell – BGH schickt Zapp nach Luxemburg', Juve (12 February 2025).
44. ibid.
45. See, for instance Regional Court of Bonn, decision of 27 March 2024, Case No. 62 Qs 1/24, NZKart, 2024, p. 275. This case was dealing with a second search warrant based on a chat record from the complainant's company, which clearly indicated a competition law infringement in the form of vertical price-fixing agreements.
46. See Directive 2019/01, recital 31.
47. Regional Court of Bonn,decision of 8 April 2024, Case No. 62 Qs 3/24, NZKart, 2024, p. 273.
48. See General Court, judgment of 5 October 2020, Case T‑249/17 – Casino, Guichard-Perrachon and AMC v Commission, para. 59 with further references.
49. See for instance, Regional Court of Bonn,decision of 16 January 2025, Case No. 62 Qs 62/24 (not published).
50.Judgement of 30 March 2023, LG Bonn, Case No. 64 Qs 53/22.
51. BverfG NStZ-RR 2013, 379.
52. Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, Kart 4/22 (V) p. 98.
53. id., p. 100.
54. BGH, Beschluss vom 23. April 2024 – KVB 56/22.
55. See Bundeskartellamt – Review of 2022 (22 December 2022), https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung /DE/Pressemitteilungen/2022/22_12_2022_Jahresr%C3%BCckblick.html; FCO, press release, 'Jahresrückblick 2024' (19 December 2024), https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs /Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2024/19_12_2024_Jahresr%C3%BCckblick.html.
56. Proposal of a draft bill for the 11th amendment of the Act against Restraints of Competition of 15 September 2022 of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Climate Protection.
58. European Commission, press release, 'Commission opens investigation into possible anticompetitive agreements in the online food delivery sector', 23 July 2024.
59. FCO, 'A Q&A with Andreas Mundt' (3 January 2025), https://www.bundeskartellamt.de /SharedDocs/Interviews/DE/2025/03012024_GCR.html.
60. Oberlandesgericht Celle, Judgment of 6 March 2025, 13 U 25/24 (Kart).
61. https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/adb27d8b-3dd8-4202-958d-198cf0740ce3_en.
Originally published by Global Competition Review.
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