Court Of Appeals Resolves Appellate Division Split And Explains When A Statute Is “sufficiently Specific” In Order To Establish Vicarious Liability Under New York’s Labor Law

Last week, the Court of Appeals decided whether the statutory language of Industrial Code Section 23-4.2(k) was “sufficiently specific” to impose vicarious liability against a construction site owner under Labor Law § 241(6). See Mann v. Mezuyon, LLC, et al., 2026 WL 1462931, 2026 N.Y. Slip. Op. 03257 (N.Y. May 26, 2026). Prior to this decision, there was a split in the Appellate Division—the Second Circuit had determined Section 23-4.2(k) was sufficiently specific, whereas the First, Third, and Fourth Circuit had held that it was not sufficiently specific. See id at *3 (citing Vicki v. City of Niagara Falls, 215 A.D.3d 1285, 1289 (4th Dept. 2023); Mohamed v. City of Watervliet, 106 A.D.3d 1244, 1247 (3d Dept. 2013); Sparendam v. Lehr Constr. Corp., 24 A.D.3d 388, 389 (1st Dept. 2005); and Zaino v. Rogers, 153 A.D.3d 763, 765 (2d Dept. 2017)). Against this split, the Court of Appeals determined that the language of the applicable section merely contained “broad” safety concerns. Therefore, because the statutory language did not also contain the requisite “specific, positive command” to address the safety concern, the Court held that the Section 23-4.2(k) was not “sufficiently specific” to create a nondelegable duty and thus hold the site owner vicarious liable under the Labor Law.

Read the full article written by Andrew Stewart on the Construction Law Blog.