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In Little v. Hecox, the Supreme Court is considering whether Idaho's Fairness in Women's Sports Act violates the Equal Protection Clause by barring transgender women and girls from participating on female-designated sports teams in public schools. The case, argued alongside West Virginia v. B.P.J., places before the Court a closely watched dispute at the intersection of equal protection doctrine, sex-based classifications, and athletic regulation.
Idaho's Fairness in Women's Sports Act, enacted in 2020, requires school athletic teams to be designated as male, female, or coeducational based on biological sex and prohibits biological males from competing on female-designated teams. The law also establishes a sex-verification mechanism that may be triggered to challenge a female athlete's eligibility, potentially requiring verification by a healthcare provider.
Respondent Lindsay Hecox, a transgender woman who sought to try out for Boise State University's women's track and cross-country teams, challenged the Act in federal district court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court entered a preliminary injunction blocking enforcement of the law, concluding that Hecox was likely to succeed on her equal protection claim.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that heightened scrutiny likely applied because the Act both targets transgender athletes and imposes sex-based classifications, including a verification process directed at female athletes. The court further concluded that Idaho's asserted interest in protecting athletic opportunities for women and girls might not be adequately served by a categorical ban that applies regardless of age, puberty, or hormone therapy.
Idaho Governor Bradley Little and intervenors petitioned for Supreme Court review on the equal protection question, and the Court granted certiorari. After the grant, however, Hecox submitted an affidavit stating that she no longer intended to compete in sports governed by the Act, raising questions about whether the case had become moot.
During oral argument on January 13, 2026, several Justices—including Justices Sotomayor, Jackson, and Alito—pressed the parties on mootness. Petitioners argued that Hecox had not satisfied the demanding standard required to establish mootness at this stage, emphasizing that her change in position occurred only after the Court agreed to hear her case.
The Justices also considered whether a decision in West Virginia v. B.P.J., argued the same day, might resolve the dispute if the Court were to dismiss Little as moot. Petitioners maintained that Supreme Court review remained necessary because the Ninth Circuit's reasoning—particularly its treatment of "sex" as encompassing gender identity for equal protection purposes—would otherwise continue to govern within that circuit.
Substantial argument focused on the constitutional meaning of "sex" and the appropriate level of scrutiny. Justice Alito questioned how courts should define sex in equal protection analysis and whether a consistent framework is necessary to evaluate claims of discrimination. Chief Justice Roberts explored whether Hecox sought to redefine the female category or carve out an exception for transgender women and what implications such reasoning might have beyond athletics.
Several Justices also examined the nature of the challenge itself. Justice Kagan questioned whether the case involved an as-applied challenge and observed that existing Supreme Court precedent provides relatively limited guidance on how equal protection principles apply in this context. She and Justice Thomas both raised concerns that allowing individualized challenges could effectively transform intermediate scrutiny into a more demanding standard requiring near-perfect legislative tailoring. Justice Jackson, by contrast, emphasized the importance of permitting individuals to challenge laws that allegedly impose unequal treatment.
Justice Barrett focused on the breadth of the statute, questioning whether applying the same categorical rule to very young children—where athletic differences may be less pronounced—posed potential constitutional problems. The argument also touched on whether transgender individuals constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class, the scientific uncertainty surrounding hormone therapy and athletic performance, and the extent to which the evidentiary record was sufficient for the Court to resolve those issues at this stage.
The Court's decision is expected later this term. Stay tuned for Dykema's decision alert analyzing the Court's opinion and its implications for equal protection litigation, education law, and sports-related regulation.
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