Unlocking New Frontiers: Canara Bank's Landmark Battle For Financial Creditor Status

The Canara Bank v. Vivek Kumar (Resolution Professional of AVJ Developers India Pvt. Ltd.)¹ is a significant recent ruling that clarifies the status of banks in real estate insolvencies. It addresses whether a bank that financed homebuyers can be treated as a financial creditor of the real estate developer under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), especially when a tripartite agreement binds the developer to refund the loan if the buyer defaults. The case highlights the interplay between insolvency law and real estate financing, and its outcome has important implications for banks, homebuyers, and developers alike. In the wake of the landmark Essar Steel² verdict on creditor distribution, this case similarly underscores the IBC's flexibility in adapting to complex financial arrangements. Below, we provide an in-depth analysis of the case, covering the facts, legal issues, decisions at various judicial forums, and its broader impact on the banking and real estate sectors.

FACTS OF THE CASE

AVJ Developers (India) Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter "AVJ Developers") was a real estate company undertaking a housing project (namely, the "AVJ Heights" project). Various homebuyers invested in flats, often using home loans from Canara Bank. For these loans, tripartite agreements were executed among the homebuyer (borrower), Canara Bank (lender), and AVJ Developers (builder). Notably, these agreements contained a clause that if the homebuyer defaulted or the builder failed to deliver the unit, the builder would refund the entire loan amount to the bank. In effect, AVJ Developers assumed a contractual obligation to indemnify or repay the bank in case of any default or non-completion of the project.

AVJ Developers eventually ran into financial trouble, and the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) admitted it into the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) in October 2019. A Resolution Professional (RP) was appointed to manage claims. Homebuyers (as allottees) filed claims as financial creditors (a right conferred by a 2018 IBC amendment upheld in Pioneer Urban Land v. Union of India)³. Canara Bank also submitted claims, not only for its own loan exposure, but effectively on behalf of the homebuyers it had financed, asserting that it should be recognized as a financial creditor of AVJ Developers to the extent of the housing loans disbursed for the project. Canara Bank pointed out that under the tripartite agreements, the developer was primarily liable to repay the loan upon the buyer's default, making the bank a creditor of the developer. The Bank also cited that it had obtained recovery certificates (decrees) from the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) against 18 out of 32 defaulting homebuyers and against the developer, reinforcing that the developer owed a debt to the bank.

The RP, however, rejected Canara Bank's claims. The RP reasoned that only individual homebuyers (allottees) could claim for the dues, since they invested the money, and that the Bank lacked authorization to file claims on the buyers' behalf. The RP viewed the loan transactions as between the bank and homebuyers, not as a debt owed by the corporate debtor (developer) to the bank. Further, the RP noted that many homebuyers had already filed their own claims, and admitting the Bank's claim could result in double counting of the same debt. The RP also relied on an earlier precedent, Axis Bank Ltd. v. Value Infracon India Pvt. Ltd. (NCLAT 2020), ⁴ which held that a lender bank cannot be treated as a financial creditor in a real estate insolvency, only the homebuyers qualify as financial creditors for such housing loans.

Faced with rejection, Canara Bank filed an application before the NCLT (Adjudicating Authority) challenging the RP's decision and seeking recognition of its claim. This set the stage for a legal battle testing the scope of "financial debt" under IBC in the context of tripartite home loan agreements.

NCLT (ADJUDICATING AUTHORITY) DECISION

The NCLT, Principal Bench (New Delhi), considered Canara Bank's application and dismissed it, siding with the RP's view. It held that Canara Bank could not be recognized as a financial creditor of AVJ Developers for the home loans given to buyers. The tribunal reasoned that the Bank had not directly disbursed any funds to the corporate debtor; the loans were extended to the homebuyers, and thus the homebuyers, not the Bank, were the real financial creditors in respect of those amounts. The developer's obligation to refund was seen as secondary or contingent, and the primary liability to repay lay with the borrowers under the loan agreements. The NCLT endorsed the approach taken in Axis Bank v. Value Infracon (NCLAT, 2020), where in an identical context a lender bank's claim was rejected on the basis that only the allottees (homebuyers) could be treated as financial creditors of the builder. It agreed that allowing the Bank's claim could result in duplication of claims, since many homebuyers had already filed claims for the same flats . The NCLT noted that the amounts paid by homebuyers (even if sourced from bank loans) are part of the homebuyers' investment in the project, which is why the IBC treats allottees as financial creditors in the first place.

In summary, the NCLT concluded that Canara Bank had no locus as a financial creditor in the CIRP of the developer. The resolution professional's decision to reject the Bank's claim was upheld, and according to the Bank's application (I.A. No. 836 of 2023 in CP(IB) 654(PB)/2019) was dismissed. This NCLT order effectively meant that the Bank was excluded from the Committee of Creditors (CoC), and only the homebuyers (as a class) would represent those debts in the insolvency process.

NCLAT (APPELLATE TRIBUNAL) DECISIONS

Canara Bank appealed to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). In December 2023, the NCLAT passed a brief order (just three paragraphs) dismissing the appeal. The appellate tribunal at that stage did not delve deeply into the facts or the tripartite agreement clauses. It simply noted that no judgment contrary to the Axis Bank/Value Infracon decision was cited by the Bank, and hence, following that precedent, the appeal lacked merit. In other words, the NCLAT initially reaffirmed that banks cannot be treated as financial creditors in real estate insolvencies where they only funded the allottees. The appeal was dismissed in a cursory manner, with the NCLAT effectively echoing the NCLT's reasoning that the developer was not directly financed by the Bank.

Thereafter, Canara Bank approached the Supreme Court of India. The Supreme Court, in Civil Appeal No. 7311/2024, found that the NCLAT had disposed of the case in a perfunctory fashion without examining the distinguishing facts. In an order dated 27 September 2024, the Supreme Court observed that "one of the issues before the NCLAT was whether as per the clauses of the relevant agreement, the developer was liable to repay the loan" – a crucial factual question. Instead of analyzing this, the NCLAT had dismissed the appeal with a "cryptic order" and incorrectly relied on its earlier judgment without noting factual differences. The Supreme Court pointed out that the prior Value Infracon case "was decided on its own facts", implying that AVJ's case might warrant a different outcome due to the unique refund clause.

Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the NCLAT's order of 19th December 2023 and remanded the matter to the NCLAT for fresh consideration on merits. Significantly, to preserve the situation, the Court directed that the resolution plan for AVJ Developers (which had been approved by the CoC and was pending before NCLT) should not be approved by the NCLT until the NCLAT decided the Bank's appeal on remand. This interim relief prevented the insolvency process from closing, thereby giving Canara Bank an opportunity to assert its rights before the CoC if it succeeded. The Supreme Court's order kept all contentions open and made it clear that it was not expressing a view on the ultimate issue but merely ensuring a proper hearing. The appeal was allowed in these terms and the case was sent back to NCLAT.

On remand, the NCLAT heard the matter in detail and delivered its judgment on 9 January 2025. This time, the NCLAT ruled in favor of Canara Bank, holding that the Bank is indeed a financial creditor of AVJ Developers due to the specific terms of the tripartite agreements. The appellate tribunal closely examined Clause 16 of the tripartite agreement, which explicitly provided that in the event of any default by the borrower or failure by the builder to fulfill the contract (such as not transferring the flat), "the entire amount advanced by the bank on behalf of the borrower shall be refunded by the builder to the bank." This clause also stated that if the builder fails to refund the amount, then the borrower/homebuyer would remain liable – essentially making the builder the primary obligor and the buyer a secondary obligor for the loan. The NCLAT found this obligation of the developer fundamentally distinguishes the case from Value Infracon, where the builder had no liability to the bank at all.

The NCLAT noted that, because of Clause 16, "the primary responsibility of repayment of the loan ............. falls on the builder/Corporate Debtor", whereas in Value Infracon the entire responsibility was on the homebuyer. In other words, AVJ Developers contractually assumed the role of a principal debtor or guarantor for the loan. This created direct privity and a "relationship of the Appellant Bank and the Corporate Debtor" satisfying the requirements of a financial debt under Section 5(8). The tribunal emphasized that normally, homebuyers (allottees) are the ones treated as financial creditors and not the lender banks, in line with the 2018 amendment and its affirmation in Pioneer Urban. However, "since the peculiar clause [16] has been provided in the present agreement which creates the rights of the Appellant bank for the right to payment," the Bank can be classified as a financial creditor to the extent of the money due from the Corporate Debtor under that clause. The Bank's claim is essentially founded on a "right to payment" against the developer, which falls within the IBC's definition of a "claim" (Section 3(6)) and hence a debt owed.

Furthermore, the NCLAT addressed other arguments: it rejected the RP's contention that the Bank's security interest was invalid due to non-registration. Citing its previous judgment, the NCLAT held that failure to register a mortgage under Section 77 of the Companies Act, 2013⁵ does not nullify the Bank's status as a secured creditor or its underlying rights. A mortgage, even if unregistered, remains a valid security interest inter se the parties, and the bank's right to enforce the mortgage (e.g. under the Transfer of Property Act and SARFAESI Act) is not lost. It quoted that non-registration alone is "not a sufficient ground to conclude that the Appellant is not a secured creditor."This meant Canara Bank could be treated as a secured financial creditor (with its mortgage over the flats, albeit unperfected, still recognized in insolvency). On the issue of the DRT recovery certificate, the NCLAT's decision did not hinge on it – given the clause 16 created the debt, the Bank's status was established even independent of the DRT decree (which, being post-CIRP commencement, was of dubious validity due to the moratorium.

In conclusion, the NCLAT allowed Canara Bank's appeal and set aside the NCLT's order. The rejection of the Bank's claim by the RP was overturned. The NCLAT directed that Canara Bank's claim be admitted as a financial debt in the CIRP of AVJ Developers, effectively entitling the Bank to participate in the Committee of Creditors (CoC) for the resolution process. This decision carved out an exception to the general rule by recognizing the Bank's claim on account of the "distinctive" contractual arrangement.

SUPREME COURT'S FINDING

The Supreme Court's role in this saga was primarily supervisory, ensuring that the matter was properly adjudicated. As discussed, the Supreme Court intervened after the NCLAT's first dismissal. In its September 2024 order, the Court did not explicitly declare Canara Bank to be a financial creditor, but its observations set the tone for the outcome on remand. The Supreme Court highlighted that NCLAT's reliance on the earlier Value Infracon precedent was potentially misplaced because that case was factually different (there, the developer had no repayment obligation to the bank). By noting that the NCLAT failed to consider whether the developer was liable to repay the loan under the agreement, the Supreme Court implied that this factual aspect was crucial.

The Supreme Court's remand order effectively gave Canara Bank a second chance to argue the merits. Importantly, the Court stayed the approval of the resolution plan till NCLAT's decision, recognizing that if the Bank's claim were vindicated, it would affect the constitution of the CoC and potentially the plan itself. This reflects the Court's inclination to ensure that no injustice was done by prematurely concluding the CIRP while a substantial creditor's status was in question.

After the NCLAT ruled in the Bank's favor in January 2025, the matter could have been taken up again to the Supreme Court by the aggrieved parties (e.g., the developer through its RP or other creditors). However, as of the time of this analysis, the Supreme Court has not delivered a further judgment on the merits, and the NCLAT's decision stands as the operative outcome. The Supreme Court's involvement thus mainly underscored the need for a nuanced application of insolvency law to the facts, and it preserved the integrity of the process by preventing the resolution plan from rendering the appeal infructuous.

In conclusion, the judicial journey saw the NCLT and initial NCLAT denying the Bank's claim, the Supreme Court reopening the matter, and the NCLAT upon rehearing recognizing the Bank as a financial creditor due to the particular contract terms. This final decision expands the scope of who can be a financial creditor in an insolvency resolution, grounded on the principle that substance should prevail over form in financial arrangements.

ANALYSIS: UNDERSTANDING THE JUDICIAL SHIFT

The core legal analysis in this case centers on the definition of financial debt under the IBC and how far its ambit can stretch to accommodate complex financing structures. A financial debt under Section 5(8) of the IBC⁶ is essentially a debt with interest disbursed against the time value of money and includes various forms of borrowing and indebtedness. Typically, in real estate, the homebuyer's advance to a builder is deemed a financial debt (by virtue of Explanation to Section 5(8)(f), as affirmed in Pioneer Urban). Here, however, the money ultimately came from a bank loan rather than the buyer's own pocket. The novelty was the contractual triangulation: the bank disbursed money (time value of money element present) which reached the developer (as payment for the flat), and the developer contractually promised to repay that money to the bank upon certain events. This arrangement has the commercial effect of a borrowing by the developer, even if indirectly. Effectively, AVJ Developers received funds (via the homebuyers) that it would have to pay back to the lender if things went awry, mirroring a loan.

The NCLAT's reasoning reflects a substance over form approach. Substance-wise, the builder's promise to repay the bank makes the builder a debtor to the bank. The NCLAT even invoked Section 3(33) of IBC⁷ (definition of "transaction"), noting that a "promise by the debtor to pay money to the creditor" in an agreement can constitute a financial transaction under the Code. By agreeing to refund the loan, the builder entered into a transaction having the effect of a guarantee or indemnity, thus creating a financial liability. Under IBC, a guarantee given by a third party for a loan is explicitly recognized as a financial debt (Section 5(8)(i) includes guarantee obligations). Although the tripartite agreement here was not framed as a separate guarantee deed, in effect Clause 16 operated as a guarantee/indemnity by the developer for the homebuyer's loan. In insolvency law (in India and elsewhere), when a guarantor guarantees a debt, the creditor has an independent claim against the guarantor's estate upon default. The NCLAT essentially treated the developer's refund obligation as akin to a guarantee that had been invoked by the buyers' default, thereby giving rise to a debt in favor of Canara Bank. This is why the Bank could be a financial creditor in AVJ's CIRP, much like any lender or guarantee-beneficiary would be in a debtor's insolvency.

It is important to note that the NCLAT was careful to distinguish this scenario from the normal one. It explicitly stated that "in a normal case it is only the homebuyers who could be treated as Financial Creditor and not lenders/bankers", reaffirming that the 2018 amendment was meant to put homebuyers in the CoC, not their financers. The peculiar clause in this case created a direct "right to payment" for the bank from the builder, which is not present in standard home loan arrangements. Thus, the decision is not a blanket ruling that all banks with home loan exposure in a project become financial creditors of the developer. It hinges on the contractual terms. Where a builder merely permits the creation of a mortgage or is a confirming party without undertaking to repay, the bank would not have a claim against the builder's estate (as was the outcome in Value Infracon). In contrast, AVJ Developers had explicitly "borrowed" in a contingent sense by assuring repayment to the bank – a crucial factual difference.

This case also illuminates how the IBC can accommodate multiple creditors for what is economically a single debt, and how to avoid double counting. One practical concern was the potential overlap between the homebuyer's claim and the bank's claim. If a homebuyer took a ₹50 lakh loan and paid it to the builder, ordinarily the homebuyer would claim ₹50 lakh in the insolvency (as financial debt). If the bank is also allowed to claim that ₹50 lakh (because the builder owes it under the indemnity), does that mean ₹100 lakh of claims for one flat? The insolvency framework must prevent any unjust double recovery. In practice, the resolution professional will need to reconcile these claims. Likely, if the bank's claim is admitted, the corresponding homebuyer's claim (for the loan amount) should be adjusted to avoid duplication. Effectively, the Bank steps into the shoes of the homebuyer for the loan portion. The NCLAT's decision implies that for those homebuyers whose loans are in default, the Bank, rather than the individuals, will represent that debt in the CoC (to the extent of the outstanding loan). Any amount the Bank recovers from the developer's insolvency would in theory reduce the liability of the homebuyer to the bank (since the bank is getting paid from another source). This dynamic is somewhat analogous to subrogation in law: a guarantor or indemnifier paying the debt takes the creditor's place, and vice versa. The NCLAT did not spell out the mechanics of adjustment, but it can be inferred that double proof for the same debt is not intended. This will be an important point for resolution professionals in similar cases – to ensure that total claims against the debtor match the real amounts owed, while allocating those claims to the correct parties (homebuyer or bank) based on the contracts in place.

On the issue of the unregistered mortgage, the NCLAT's stance aligns with a growing view that non-compliance with charge registration, while a lapse, does not extinguish the underlying security. Under the Companies Act, an unregistered charge is void against the liquidator and other creditors. However, courts and tribunals have recognized that the equitable rights of the mortgagee remain, and in an insolvency scenario, lack of registration might subordinate the security interest but not transform a secured creditor into an unsecured one per se. The NCLAT cited precedent to hold the Bank is to be treated as a secured creditor despite the technical omission. This is significant because it means Canara Bank would not only enter the CoC but do so as a secured financial creditor, presumably with voting share corresponding to its outstanding loan amounts. Its rights to enforce the mortgage (e.g. auction the allotted unit) also survive, though in CIRP those enforcement rights are stayed in favor of collective resolution. The ruling gives comfort to lenders that their security isn't completely lost due to a procedural miss, at least in the context of resolution (in liquidation, the question of priority might still be litigated, but NCLAT indicates the first charge holder's rights prevail even if the charge wasn't registered).

The Bank's argument about holding a DRT decree for some of the loans was a double-edged sword. While a decree would ordinarily cement the debt, obtaining it during the moratorium violated Section 14 and could even be considered void ab initio. The RP alleged the Bank concealed the ongoing CIRP from the DRT. The NCLAT rightly did not rely on the DRT order to establish the debt. Instead, it treated the debt as arising from the contract itself (the tripartite agreement) and the default on the loan. The takeaway is that a financial creditor does not need a court decree to prove its debt in insolvency; the contractual default and filings are sufficient. Decree or no decree, the Bank's claim was admissible because of the underlying transaction. If anything, the DRT's involvement created additional legal risk for the Bank (for violating the moratorium), but the NCLAT appears to have sidestepped that issue in light of the ultimate decision on merits. Alignment with IBC's Purpose: One might ask, does allowing a financing bank into the CoC align with the IBC's objectives? The IBC aims to bring all financial creditors together to resolve the debtor's distress. Homebuyers were included by law because they fund projects substantially and needed a voice. Typically, a bank that only lent to the buyer has no stake in the developer's insolvency except indirectly through the buyer. But in this case, the bank does have a stake because the developer promised repayment. Economically, the Bank's money fueled the project just as the buyers' own funds did. The Supreme Court in Pioneer noted a dissenting view that if a homebuyer took a loan, perhaps the lender should sit at the table instead of the homebuyer. The Court ultimately kept the homebuyer at the table, reasoning that whether the buyer's money was borrowed or not should make no difference to their rights. The present case doesn't overturn that principle; homebuyers remain financial creditors. It instead creates a parallel recognition: when a developer contractually binds itself to a lender, that lender can join the table in addition to the homebuyers. This arguably furthers the IBC's goal of comprehensive resolution – all stakeholders with a financial stake (in this case, both the buyers and the bank) are part of the process. The CoC can thus craft a resolution plan that accounts for the bank's claim (perhaps by direct repayment or substitution of collateral etc.) along with the homebuyers' interests (perhaps completion of homes). The decision prevents a scenario where the bank's only recourse would be to individually chase defaulting homebuyers or enforce mortgages on half-built flats, which could be chaotic and value- destructive. Instead, through IBC, the bank can coordinate with other creditors for a holistic solution for the project.

It's worth noting that this decision does not mean every lender in similar circumstances will automatically be a financial creditor – the contract must clearly support that outcome. Going forward, banks and financial institutions may insist on including similar refund/guarantee clauses in tripartite agreements with developers to protect their interests. If such clauses are present, this case will stand as a persuasive precedent to admit the bank as a financial creditor. Conversely, developers might become wary of agreeing to such terms, since it elevates the bank's rights in a potential insolvency. We may see more nuanced drafting of tripartite agreements in the future, balancing the developer's desire to limit liability with the bank's risk mitigation strategies.

Therefore, the NCLAT's analytic approach in Canara Bank v. AVJ Developers aligns with the IBC's flexible, equitable design. It interprets financial debt broadly enough to encompass a unique three-party financing arrangement, thereby upholding the sanctity of contractual commitments made by the debtor. At the same time, it preserves the spirit of the law that primarily homebuyers are financial creditors by treating this as an exceptional case based on evidence of the developer's direct liability.

REDEFINING REAL ESTATE INSOLVENCY: HOW CANARA BANK'S VICTORY RESHAPES STAKEHOLDER DYNAMICS AND LENDING PRACTICES

This judgement has far-reaching implications for the banking, real estate, and insolvency sectors. For banks, this decision encourages incorporating strong refund or guarantee clauses in tripartite agreements with developers, ensuring greater protection and better recovery prospects through the insolvency process if a homebuyer defaults. This precedent is likely to increase banks' confidence in financing under-construction projects, knowing they have a direct contractual claim against the developer's assets. Consequently, standard loan documentation may evolve, with banks demanding clearer protective clauses that can support their claims as financial creditors during insolvency.

For developers, the ruling introduces both opportunities and risks. While such clauses may facilitate home sales by securing bank financing for buyers, they simultaneously expose developers to direct financial liability towards banks. Developers may be compelled to accept such terms to ensure project financing, effectively positioning themselves as co-borrowers or guarantors. This increases insolvency risks, as they could face claims from both homebuyers and banks, thereby incentivizing timely project completion to avoid triggering repayment obligations. Homebuyers, although potentially concerned about the dilution of their voting rights in the Committee of Creditors (CoC), may benefit from the inclusion of banks in the resolution process. Banks bring financial expertise and may favor resolution plans that prioritize project completion, which aligns with the homebuyers' interests. Coordination between banks and homebuyers could strengthen efforts to revive stalled projects, with banks possibly contributing additional funding and facilitating smoother resolutions.

This case also alters CoC dynamics by adding institutional lenders like Canara Bank to a forum previously dominated by homebuyers. The bank's voting power can influence the approval of resolution plans, requiring resolution applicants to account for their claims and negotiate fair distribution of recovery. While this adds complexity, it promotes a more balanced and professional decision-making process within the CoC, ensuring that all stakeholders' interests are fairly represented.

From a legal perspective, this decision may prompt similar creditors to assert claims based on comparable contractual guarantees, and courts may be called upon to clarify the threshold for such claims—whether explicit guarantees are required, or broad indemnities suffice. While the NCLAT provided the legal reasoning in this case, future Supreme Court judgments or legislative interventions may refine this area of law. Lastly, from a regulatory standpoint, banks may need to reassess risk management strategies, recognizing that such undertakings from developers can affect exposure classification and provisioning. However, given the specific facts of this case, it is unlikely to prompt immediate systemic regulatory changes. Overall, this judgment strengthens the insolvency framework by recognizing all genuine financial stakeholders, promoting better contracting practices, and aligning the interests of banks, developers, and homebuyers towards maximizing asset value and ensuring successful project completions.

CONCLUSION

The Canara Bank v. Vivek Kumar (RP of AVJ Developers) case is a noteworthy development in Indian insolvency law, reinforcing the idea that the substance of financial arrangements prevails over form. The introduction of homebuyers as financial creditors in the IBC was a bold step to protect consumers; this case takes it a step further by acknowledging the role of their financers when the facts justify it. We saw that a normally straightforward principle ("banks that lend to buyers are not creditors of the builder") can admit an exception if the builder has undertaken a direct debt obligation. The NCLT's strict view was gradually overturned through appellate scrutiny, culminating in a decision that balanced the interests of all parties.

Going forward, we can expect this ruling to influence how homebuyer loan agreements are structured and how claims are handled in similar CIRPs. It also serves as a reminder to resolution professionals to look beyond labels and examine the actual financial relationships when admitting claims. For the real estate and banking industries, the case injects a new dynamic that could lead to more collaborative approaches in resolving distressed housing projects – with homebuyers and banks possibly working in tandem under the IBC framework to achieve resolutions that are in the interest of both.

In sum, Canara Bank stands as a landmark judgment in the insolvency domain, much like the Essar Steel verdict in its impact on creditor rights. It exemplifies the judiciary's role in fine-tuning the balance between debtor obligations and creditor entitlements. By recognizing the bank as a financial creditor, the outcome sends a clear message: when a corporate debtor has, in effect, borrowed money (even indirectly) and benefitted from it, it cannot evade the corresponding liability in insolvency by pointing to form alone. This promotes fairness, ensures confidence among financial institutions, and ultimately contributes to the IBC's goal of timely and effective resolution of corporate distress while protecting diverse stakeholder interests.

Footnotes

1. Canara Bank v. Vivek Kumar, Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 390 of 2023, NCLAT New Delhi.

2. Comm. of Creditors of Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta, (2020) 8 SCC 531.

3. Pioneer Urban Land v. Union of India, (2019) 8 SCC 416.

4. Axis Bank Ltd. v. Value Infracon India Pvt. Ltd., Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 676 of 2020 (NCLAT Apr. 13, 2020).

5. Section 77 of the Companies Act, No. 18 of 2013.

6. Section 5 (8) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016.

7. Section 33 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016.

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