In a significant reaffirmation of the importance of procedural discipline in Indian litigation, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran & Anr.[2025 SCC OnLine SC 1093] has clarified the stringent standards required for condoning delay in legal proceedings. The judgment underscores that limitation periods are not mere technicalities but reflect a broader public policy objective of ensuring finality and judicial efficiency. Through this decision, the Court underscores that applications for condonation of delay must be supported by bona fide and well-substantiated reasons and vague assertions, or negligent conduct will not be accepted.
Brief Factual Background
The dispute originated from a suit for specific performance of a Sale Agreement. The Trial Court passed an ex-parte decree against the defendants due to their absence during proceedings. Subsequently, the defendants filed applications to set aside the ex-parte decree, accompanied by requests to condone delays of 712 and 467 days, respectively.
The High Court in a separate Revision Petition preferred before it subsequently, despite acknowledging the lack of substantial evidence explaining the delay, condoned it on the grounds of providing the defendants an opportunity for a fair trial upon a payment of costs of INR 1,00,000/-. This decision was challenged by preferring an Appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
Decision and Analysis
The Hon'ble Supreme Court vide Order dated 13.05.2025 overturned the Hon'ble Madras High Court's decision condoning a delay of 1116 days in filing an appeal against the Ex-Parte decree, which had become final after being dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a different set of proceedings, on account of insufficiency of the reasons provided for the delay. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case held as under:
31. It is a well-settled law that while considering the plea for condonation of delay, the first and foremost duty of the court is to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation rather than starting with the merits of the main matter. Only when sufficient cause or reasons given for the delay by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced or stand on equal footing, the court may consider the merits of the main matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
32. Further, this Court has repeatedly emphasised in several cases that delay should not be condoned merely as an act of generosity. The pursuit of substantial justice must not come at the cost of causing prejudice to the opposing party. In the present case, the respondents/defendants have failed to demonstrate reasonable grounds of delay in pursuing the matter, and this crucial requirement for condoning the delay remains unmet.
33. Therefore, in the case at hand, once it has been established that the reasons provided for condoning the delay in the application filed are not sufficient, we are not inclined to go into the merits of the contentions raised by the learned counsel of Respondents regarding Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
EMPHASIS SUPPLIED
The ‘Sufficient Cause' threshold and its context in Arbitration
While the aforesaid decision arose from a civil suit context, the implications of this ruling extend well beyond the civil suit in question, directly updating how courts assess delay under tightly drawn statutory schemes, including the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Act”), especially with the strict timelines prescribed under Section 34(3) of the Act.
Section 34(3) of the Act stipulates three months for challenging an arbitral award, which may further be extended up to thirty (30) days subject to satisfying the court of having “sufficient cause” for delay necessitating such an extension, but not thereafter. The proviso to the section clearly states that no application under Section 34 of the Act shall be entertained after the expiry of the prescribed three months plus the additional thirty (30) days, unless the court is satisfied that the aggrieved party had a valid reason or “sufficient cause” which prevented them from making the application challenging the arbitral award, within the prescribed time period. Section 34(3) of the Act reads as follows:
“34. Application for setting aside arbitral award –
(1) …
(2) …
(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.
(4) …
(5) …
(6) … ”
EMPHASIS SUPPLIED
In view of the clear provision of the Section 34(3) of the Act and the various judgments passed by this Hon'ble Court and various High Courts, no challenge to an Award can be made after the lapse of the period of three months unless court is satisfied that the Applicant had a valid and sufficient reason from which hindered them from filing the application within the stipulated period, the court may entertain such application within a further period of thirty (30) days but not thereafter.
Therefore, the extended period of thirty (30) days as provided under section 34(3) of the Act has its importance and merely because the challenge has been filed within this extended period of 30 days, does not ipso facto entitle the Applicant to condonation of the delay. The time limit is inflexible, i.e., no challenge can be entertained after this additional period. However, it is to be noted that it is not a 120 days' period by default, but rather a 3 months (90 days) limit with a discretionary 30 days' window granted only upon showing of proper justification or sufficient cause.
This principle has been time and again upheld by courts, and several judgments in the attached compilation reaffirm the same.
In the recent judicial pronouncements, including the landmark judgment in Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India [(2019) 2 SCC 455], the Hon'ble Supreme Court was unequivocal. On 05.12.2018, in the said case, it held that “A plain reading of Sub-section (3) along with the proviso to Section 34 of the 1996 Act, shows that the application for setting aside the award on the grounds mentioned in Sub-section (2) of Section 34 could be made within three months and the period can only be extended for a further period of thirty days on showing sufficient cause and not thereafter. The use of the words ‘but not thereafter' in the proviso makes it clear that the extension cannot be beyond thirty days.”
The Hon'ble Delhi High Court on 04.06.2020 in Chintels India Ltd. v. Bhayana Builders Pvt. Ltd. [2020 SCC OnLine Del 1715], emphasized that the additional 30 days is not an entitlement, but a judicial discretion exercised only if sufficient cause is shown. The Court observed that “Section 34(3) of the Act provides a limitation period of 3 months for filing objections against an Arbitral Award. Proviso to Section 34(3) of the Act provides an extended period of 30 days for filing the application and the Court has the discretion to condone the delay, provided sufficient cause is shown by the party which prevented it from approaching the Court, in the limitation period of 3 months.”
Further, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court on 20.11.2019 in The Secretary/Chief Commissioner Transport Department v. M/s Gaurav Enterprises [O.M.P. (COMM) 351/2017], rejected an application for condonation of delay as the Petitioner failed to set out any ground in the application on which the delay could be condoned, leave along ‘sufficient cause' as required under proviso to Section 34(3) of the Act. The Hon'ble Court observed that “The present application which has been filed seeking condonation of delay clearly reveals that no effort has been made by the petitioner worth a mention to set out any grounds which prevented the petitioner from approaching this Court within the limitation period of 3 months. Not even a whisper has been made in the application explaining even the delay of 18 days taken to file the petition, after the expiry of 3 months”. Accordingly, it held that the delay of 18 days was unexplained and hence could not be condoned.
In another judgment passed by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court on 01.10.2019 in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Joint Venture of Sai Rama Engineering Enterprises & Megha Engineering & Infrastructure Limited [2019 SCC OnLine Del 10456], the Court held that “Reading of the Section 34(3) of the Act, leaves no manner of doubt that the period of limitation is three months. If the objections are filed beyond three months, then the delay in filing can be condoned upto a maximum period of 30 days and no more. Condonation of delay in the extended period of 30 days, is at the discretion of the Court, provided, the party satisfies the Court that there was ‘sufficient cause' for the delay. Delay in initial filing, beyond 30 days cannot be condoned, even for one day. The Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Popular Construction, (2001) 8 SCC 470 has clearly held that the legislative intent of providing a strict and non-flexible limitation period should not be defeated by condoning the delay, without ‘sufficient cause'.”
Further, the Court also highlighted that “…while in condonation of delay, the Courts have been generally liberal, but when it comes to Section 34(3) of the Act, the limitation period is inelastic and meant to be strictly followed. Therefore, under this jurisdiction, the applicant would have to pass a higher threshold of showing that his conduct was of due diligence and dispatch and a casual explanation for delay cannot and should not be accepted. The applicant has to show not only due diligence in filing within the 30 days period, but more importantly, “sufficient cause” has to be shown, which prevented the applicant for 3 months in filing the petition.”
Further, on Non-Est Filings and Re-filings, there are several judgments [Chintels India Ltd. v. Bhayana Builders Pvt. Ltd. (2020 SCC OnLine Del 1715); Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Joint Venture of Sai Rama Engineering Enterprises & Megha Engineering & Infrastructure Limited (2019 SCC OnLine Del 10456); Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, Dept. of Ports, Govt. of Indiav.Ernst and Young Pvt. Ltd(2023 SCC OnLine Del 5182)] which highlight the distinction between initial filing and refiling. The Courts have held that if the initial filing does not meet the bare minimum legal requirements for filing (such as signed petition, vakalatnama, affidavits, etc.), it cannot be treated as a valid filing, thereby impacting the computation of limitation period and cannot be treated as valid filing to stop the clock under Section 34(3) of the Act.
Conclusion
The judgment in Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran & Anr.[2025 SCC OnLine SC 1093] serves as a vital reaffirmation of the principle that procedural timelines in litigation are not merely directory but mandatory, forming the bedrock of judicial certainty and finality. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has made it clear that delay cannot be condoned as a matter of routine but can be condoned only based on genuine, well-substantiated explanations. This focus on the standards of establishing “sufficient cause” closely aligns with the underlying principles of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, specifically with Section 34(3) thereof, which underlines the legislative intent to ensure and promote speed and efficiency in the dispute resolution. In other words, the 30 days' extension cannot be sought as a matter of right or is not a guaranteed grace period but it is a narrow corridor, where courts exercise discretion sparingly and only on proof of genuine, unavoidable delay.
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