Dispute Resolution And Arbitration Update

In The High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad Narsing Ganpatrao Ankushkar [Petitioner] Vs. Balaji Pandharinath Thorat & Ors. [Respondents]

Writ Petition No. 4075 of 2015 (Decided on 08.04.2026)

Background facts

• The present Writ Petition was filed challenging the order dated 15.01.2015 passed by the State Information Commission, Aurangabad, whereby the Information Officer was directed to disclose the service record of the Petitioner.
• The Petitioner, a public servant serving as Deputy Superintendent of Police, contended that Respondent No.1 had sought information relating to his service record under the provisions of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (“RTI Act”).
• The application for disclosure was initially rejected by the Information Officer, and the rejection was upheld by the First Appellate Authority.
• Aggrieved, Respondent No.1 preferred a Second Appeal before the State Information Commission, which allowed the appeal and directed disclosure of the Petitioner’s service records.
• The Petitioner challenged the said order on the grounds that: the information sought constituted “personal information” exempt under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act; and no opportunity of hearing was granted to the Petitioner as a “third party” as mandated under Section 11 of the RTI Act.
• Respondent No.1 contended that the information was necessary to verify the genuineness of the Petitioner’s caste validity certificate and that disclosure was warranted in larger public interest.

Issue(s) at hand?

• Whether service records of a public servant constitute “personal information” exempt from disclosure under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act?
• Whether compliance with Section 11 of the RTI Act (third-party hearing) is mandatory prior to disclosure of such information?
• Whether disclosure of personal information can be directed without recording satisfaction regarding “larger public interest”?

Findings of the Court

• The Hon’ble Court held that service records of an employee constitute “personal information” within the meaning of Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act and are ordinarily exempt from disclosure.
• It was observed that disclosure of such personal information can only be justified if the authority records satisfaction that larger public interest outweighs the right to privacy.
• The Court relied on Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v. CIC¹ to reiterate that service-related details are private in nature and cannot be disclosed as a matter of right.
• The Court further emphasized that compliance with Section 11 is mandatory where third-party information is sought to be disclosed.
• It was held that failure to issue notice to the affected third party; and provide an opportunity of hearing vitiates the entire decision-making process.
• The Court also relied on Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal² to reiterate that third-party consultation is a statutory safeguard and not a mere formality.
• It was further held that the Second Appellate Authority failed to: consider the exemption under Section 8(1)(j); and record any finding regarding existence of larger public interest.
• Consequently, the impugned order was held to be contrary to statutory provisions and legally unsustainable.
• The Writ Petition was accordingly allowed and the impugned order directing disclosure was set asides.

In The Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad M/s. Ashish Enterprises [Appellant] Vs. Commissioner, GST, Customs & Central Excise, Kanpur [Respondent]

Service Tax Appeal No.70204 of 2021

Background facts

• Appellant is engaged in providing construction services inter alia in respect of Commercial or Industrial Building and Civil Structure to Government Organizations and also to few private parties. They are registered under ‘Works Contract Services’, ‘Erection, Commissioning Installation Services’ and other taxable services.
• Revenue called for documents and attested copies of the ST-3 Return for FY 2010-11 and 2011 12. On perusal of documents and conclusion of an inquiry they opined that the Appellant had suppressed the material facts with intent to evade payment of duties and have evaded Service Tax amounting to Rs.4,74,66,698/- during the period from 01.04.2009 to 31.03.2014.
• Accordingly, a Show Cause Notice dated 21.10.2014 was issued to the Appellant claiming the above dues with interest and penalty.
• Vide order dated 03.01.2017 issued by the Respondent (“First Order”), it was directed that Appellant was liable for service tax of Rs. 4,27,31,692.
• The First Order was appealed by the Appellant and the same was allowed by the Ld. Tribunal vide order dated 23.04.2019 (“Remand Order”) and the matter was remanded back to Respondent for reconsideration particularly on issues of abatement, limitation and in light of the judgment of M/s. Nitesh Estates Ltd. v/s. Commissioner of Central Excise, Service Tax & Customs, Bangalore.
• Vide order dated 29.01.2021 issued by the Respondent (“Impugned Order”), partial abatement benefit was allowed and it was held that Appellant was liable for service tax of Rs. 1,67,83,479.
• Aggrieved by the Second Order, the subject appeal was filed by the Appellant.

Issue(s) at hand?

• Whether or not the services provided by the Appellant were in relation to residential plots fulfilling the criteria under the judgment of M/s. Nitesh Estates Ltd. v/s. Commissioner of Central Excise, Service Tax & Customs, Bangalore?

Findings of the Court

• Construction of ‘Residential Complex Services’ is taxable under section 65(100)(zzz-h) of Finance Act 1994 with effect from 16.06.2005. By virtue of Section 65 (91-a) of Finance Act, the definition of residential complexes does not comprise of residential complexes constructed for personal use.
• In M/s. Nitesh Estates Ltd. v/s. Commissioner of Central Excise, Service Tax & Customs, Bangalore1 it has thus been categorically held that if a residential complex is to be used for personal use and not commercial or industrial use, the construction services provided for the same is not subject to levy of service tax. The important clarification given was that if the residential complex is constructed for a company which in turn utilises the said complex for accommodating or residential use by the employees of that organisation, such construction services also enjoy the same exemption and are not liable to service tax.
• The matter was remanded back to the Respondent for reconsideration inter alia considering the above judgment. The Impugned Order distinguished the facts of the present case with Nitesh Estates case by holding that in the said case the services were provided by a main/primary contractor whereas in the subject matter as the Appellant was a sub-contractor for some of the services they were liable. However, such distinction was deemed incorrect by the Ld. Tribunal. In respect of the services rendered by the Appellant, some of them were for residential colony not used for commerce or industry and accordingly they were not taxable whether or not they were provided as contractor or sub-contractor.
• Further, with respect to the issue of limitation it was observed that the Impugned Order was erroneous. The limitation for claiming service tax dues as per section 73 (1) of Finance Act, 1991 is 30 months but in certain cases such as fraud or collusion, the same may be extended to 5 years. In the present case it was observed that, the Revenue had also failed to show that the Appellant had intentionally supressed any facts. The Appellant had in fact recorded all the  transactions in its books and if the service tax was not paid by them, the same was due to their bona fide opinion that they were not responsible to pay the same. Further, the case law of Quest Engineers & Consultants Pvt. Ltd. v/s Commissioner CGST2 makes it clear that extended limitation cannot be claimed for service tax dues where the show cause notice or proceedings have been initiated on the basis of balance sheet or Form 26AS. Therefore, as no case of extended limitation was made out the Revenue was not entitled to claim the dues beyond limitation. 

In The Supreme Court of India Civil Appellate Jurisdiction Vadiyala Prabhakar Rao & Ors. Vs. The Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.

2026 SCC Online SC 815

Background facts

• In the present case, the dispute arose from land situated in Survey No. 81 of Kalvalanagaram Village, located in the State of Telangana. The land originally belonged to the Nizam of Hyderabad, and pattas were granted in favour of the Appellants and their predecessors, after a proposal was made to notify about 787 acres in Survey No. 81 as forest land (“Subject Land”). Thereafter, the land was mutated in the names of predecessors and later on in favour of the Appellants.
• Subsequently, a Gazette Notification dated 06.02.1950 was issued under Section 7(1) of the Hyderabad Forest Act, 1326, whereby an extent of 787 acres in Survey No. 81 of Kalvalanagram village was declared as a reserved forest. The Appellants claimed that the inclusion of their alleged patta lands within the forest block was illegal. Therefore, the Petitioner filed an application before the Joint Collector, Khammam, seeking exclusion of nearly 600 acres of land situated in Survey No. 81 of Kalvalanagram village, Khammam District. The Appellants also relied upon an order dated 08.10.1984, whereby the Commissioner of Survey, Settlement and Land Records was directed to conduct an inquiry and submit a report. In the said report, it was acknowledged that no primary record relating to the Subject land was available. However, another report dated 07.01.1990 of Mandal Revenue Officer, Pinapaka, Mandal, Khammam District, despite the absence of such records, suggested that the patta lands in Survey No. 81 be excluded from the proposed forest land area and also observed that the Forest Settlement Officer had the power to consider and decide exclusion of such land accordingly. Nevertheless, the Joint Collector rejected the Appellants’ claim in 2003 on the ground that they had failed to produce original title documents, namely the patta certificates, and that mere revenue entries could not establish ownership.
• The Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court subsequently allowed the Writ of Mandamus bearing WP No. 19107 of 2003, wherein the Appellants had prayed for (i)Issuance of Writ of Mandamus declaring the Joint Collector order dated. 19.05.2003 illegal, and (ii) Claims and rights of Appellants over the Subject land under sections 10 & 11, Hyderabad Forest Act, 1355F. The Single Judge of the High Court held that the forest reservation proceedings were ultra vires. However, the Division Bench reversed this decision, leading to the Appeal before the Supreme Court.
• The Appellants argued that their title was sufficiently established through long-standing revenue entries and supporting revenue documents. According to them, the names of their predecessors had consistently appeared in revenue records, thereby creating a presumption of ownership and possession.
• However, the State Government and Forest Department strongly opposed the Appellants’ claim. Their principal argument was that revenue records by themselves do not create or confer title. The respondents emphasised that the Appellants had failed to produce the foundational document of title, namely the original patta.

Issue(s) at hand?

• The Supreme Court primarily considered the following issues:
  • Whether entries in revenue records such as Pahanies, Faisal Patti, Vasool Baqi, and mutation registers are sufficient to establish title over immovable property.
  • Whether the Appellants had successfully proved ownership over the disputed land despite the non-production of original patta documents.
  • Whether the matter ought to have been remanded for adjudication before a competent civil forum.

Decision of Court/Tribunal

• The Supreme Court delivered an important reiteration of the settled principle that revenue entries do not confer title. The Court carefully analysed earlier precedents and reaffirmed that mutation records, Pahanies, Jamabandi entries, and similar revenue documents are maintained only for fiscal and administrative purposes. Revenue entries may raise a limited presumption regarding possession, but they cannot replace substantive title documents. In the present case, the appellants’ inability to produce the original pattas significantly weakened their claim.
• The Court also relied upon Sohan Lal vs. Union of India, citing that such property disputes are to be resolved by civil courts and are not under the purview of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Court further correctly observed that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is not intended for adjudicating disputed questions of title involving complex factual controversies. The Single Judge had effectively granted a declaration of ownership while exercising limited judicial review powers, which exceeded the permissible scope of writ jurisdiction.

In The Supreme Court of India Home Care Retail Marts Pvt. Ltd [Appellant] Vs. Haresh N. Sanghavi [Respondent]

2026 SCC OnLine SC 670

Background facts

• The present appeals arose from the Impugned Order passed by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in SLP (C) No. 29972 of 2015, whereby the appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) were dismissed. While dismissing the appeals, the Hon’ble Bombay High Court relied upon its earlier judgment in Dirk India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Maharashtra State Electricity Generation Co. Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 481, wherein it was held that post-award interim relief under Section 9 of the Act is intended only to protect the “fruits of the arbitral award”. The Hon’ble Court in the said judgment had further observed that proceedings under Section 34 of the Act only permit the Court to either set aside or uphold the arbitral award and not modify it. Accordingly, since an unsuccessful party has no “fruits of the award” to protect, such a party was held not entitled to seek interim relief under Section 9 of the Act.
• Prior to the present judgment, conflicting views existed among various High Courts on the issue of whether an unsuccessful party in arbitral proceedings could maintain a petition under Section 9 of the Act at the post-award stage. While the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Dirk India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Maharashtra State Electricity Generation Co. Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 481, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Nussli Switzerland Ltd. vs. Organizing Committee Commonwealth Games, 2010, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 4834 as well as National Highways Authority of India vs. Punjab National Bank and Anr., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 4810, the Hon’ble Madras High Court in A. Chidambaram vs. S. Rajagopal and Ors., OA No. 843 of 2024 and the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in Smt. Padma Mahadev & Ors. vs. M/s. Sierra Constructions Private Limited, COMAP No. 2 of 2021, dated 22nd March 2021 have held that a party unsuccessful in arbitral proceedings cannot maintain a petition under Section 9 of the Act.
• On the other hand, the Hon’ble Telangana High Court in M/s Saptarishi Hotels Pvt. Ltd & Anr. vs. National Institute of Tourism & Hospitality Management (NITHM), 2019 SCC OnLine TS 1765, the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in GAIL (India) Ltd. vs. Latin Rasayani Pvt. Ltd., 2014 SCC OnLine Guj 14836 and the Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in M/s DLF Home Developers Ltd. vs. M/s Orris Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., FAO-CARB-51-2024 (O&M), dated 21 st February, 2025), have taken a contrary view and held that even an unsuccessful party may, in appropriate circumstances, can maintain a petition under Section 9 of the Act.

Issue(s) at hand?

• The substantial question of law that arises for consideration is whether a petition under Section 9 of the Act at the post-award Stage, by an unsuccessful party that has lost in the arbitral proceedings and has no enforceable award in its favour, maintainable in law?

Findings of the Court

• The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the expression “a party” under Section 9 of the Act must be interpreted in its plain and ordinary sense. Since Section 2(h) defines a party simply as a party to the arbitration agreement, the provision does not distinguish between a successful and an unsuccessful party in arbitration proceedings. The Court observed that by inferring such a restriction into Section 9 of the Act would amount to rewriting the statute, which is impermissible in law. Accordingly, the meaning of the expression “a party” cannot change depending upon the outcome of the arbitral proceedings.
• The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that Section 9 of the Act permits parties to seek interim protection before commencement of arbitration, during arbitral proceedings, and after the award until its enforcement under Section 36 of the Act. The provision nowhere restricts post award interim relief only to successful parties. Therefore, any party to the arbitration agreement may seek protection under Section 9 of the Act until the judicial process reaches its conclusion.
• The Hon’ble Court also clarified that Sections 34 and 36 of the Act operate in a different sphere from Section 9. While Sections 34 and 36 of the Act deal with challenge and enforcement of arbitral awards, Section 9 of the Act concerns protection of the subject matter of the dispute. The Court observed that denying interim protection to an unsuccessful party may leave such a party without an effective remedy, particularly where the award is under challenge and may ultimately be set aside.
• The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that the judgments in Dirk India, Nussli Switzerland, Padma Mahadev and A. Chidambaram did not lay down the correct law insofar as they restricted Section 9 of the Act only to securing the “fruits of the award”. Relying upon Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 986 the Hon’ble Court observed that courts possess limited powers to modify or sever arbitral awards, and therefore the rights of parties may still change during proceedings under Sections 34 and 37 of the Act. The Hon’ble Court also held that the expressions “subject matter of arbitration” and “amount in dispute” used in Section 9 of the Act are wider than merely protecting the award-holder. 
• The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the interpretation of Section 9 of the Act must include unsuccessful parties in exceptional situations, such as cases involving fraud, lack of notice, or risk of irreparable prejudice pending challenge proceedings under Section 34. The Hon’ble Court recognised that immediate withdrawal of interim protection after an award may, in certain cases, defeat the purpose of challenge proceedings.
• At the same time, the Hon’ble Supreme Court clarified that interim relief under Section 9 of the Act would continue to depend upon established principles such as existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable harm. However, the threshold for grant of interim relief would naturally be higher where such relief is sought by an unsuccessful party, and such relief should be granted only in rare and compelling circumstances.
• Accordingly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that an unsuccessful party in arbitration is also entitled to invoke Section 9 of the Act at the post-award stage, and the contrary views taken by various High Courts where unsuccessful parties in arbitration were denied the right to seek relief under Section 9 of the Act does not lay down the correct law.

State of West Bengal & Ors. Vs. M/S B.B.M. Enterprises

2026 INSC 358

Background facts

• The dispute arose out of a construction contract under which the Respondent contractor completed the entrusted works on July 30, 2000. Thereafter, a communication dated January 4, 2001, was issued concerning part payment to be made to the Respondent contractor. However, no final bill was prepared or determined, nor was any final measurement certificate issued by the Engineer-in-Charge in terms of the contractual framework.
• Following the aforesaid communication of 2001, the Respondent contractor took no further steps in relation to its alleged claims and remained inactive for approximately 21 years. It was only on June 2, 2022, that the Respondent contractor issued a notice invoking arbitration and seeking commencement of arbitral proceedings.
• Subsequently, proceedings were initiated before the High Court under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, for appointment of an arbitrator. The High Court allowed the application, holding inter alia that Clause 7 of the agreement was ambiguous in nature and that the failure of the Engineer-in-Charge to determine the final payable amounts or issue the requisite measurement certificate had the effect of neutralizing the objection as to limitation.
• Aggrieved by the revival of a dispute after more than two decades, the State of West Bengal preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court challenging the order appointing the arbitrator.

Issue(s) at hand?

• Whether a notice for arbitration issued 21 years after the completion of work can validly initiate dispute resolution proceedings.
• Whether the failure of an authority to issue a final measurement certificate or determine final dues indefinitely extends the limitation period for a substantive claim.

Findings of the Court

• The Hon’ble Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court, holding that the claims sought to be referred to arbitration were ex facie dead and hopelessly barred by limitation. The Hon’ble Court reiterated that although arbitration is a preferred mode of dispute resolution, it cannot operate in derogation of settled legal principles, particularly the principle that the law aids the vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights.
• Relying upon the decisions in Vidya Drolia and Ors v. Durga Trading Corporation and BSNL and Anr. v. Nortel Networks India Private Limited, the Hon’ble Court drew a distinction between the limitation applicable to filing a petition seeking reference to arbitration, which is procedural in nature, and the limitation governing the substantive contractual claims. While observing that the Referral Court is not expected to undertake a detailed evidentiary examination at the referral stage, the Hon’ble Court clarified that it is nevertheless duty-bound to decline reference where the claims are ex facie barred by limitation. In the facts of the present case, the contractor had remained inactive for nearly 21 years, rendering the claims “dead claims” incapable of being revived through arbitration proceedings.
• Placing reliance on Arif Azim Company Limited v. Aptech Limited, the Hon’ble Court further reiterated that courts must, at the threshold stage, prima facie scrutinize and reject non-arbitrable or stale claims so as to prevent parties from being subjected to prolonged and unnecessary arbitral proceedings. Applying Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes a limitation period of three years for recovery claims, the Hon’ble Court rejected the High Court’s view that the Engineer’s failure to act had the effect of extending limitation.
• The Supreme Court held that upon the Engineer’s inaction, the Respondent contractor ought to have invoked arbitration within the prescribed period instead of remaining dormant for over two decades. The Supreme Court accordingly observed that the Respondent contractor had neither raised a final bill nor sought payment for an inordinate period of 21 years, thereby rendering the claims hopelessly time barred.
• In view of the foregoing findings, the Hon’ble Supreme Court concluded that the claims were ex facie dead and barred by limitation and, consequently, set aside the initiation of arbitration proceedings. The Supreme Court emphasized that judicial processes cannot be employed to resurrect claims that have long extinguished under the scheme of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Footnotes

1 (2013) 1 SCC 212

2 (2020) 5 SCC 48

1 2015 (40) STR 815 (Tribunal – Bangalore)

2 Service Tax Appeal No. 70616 of 2019

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