We Need Another Hero: Fossil Fuels Versus Renewable Energy Production — Which Is The Alternative? (Part 1)

For decades, energy policy debates in the United States have largely centered on a familiar tension: economic growth versus environmental protection. Today, however, that framing increasingly feels incomplete. Around the world, the transition toward electrification, advanced energy infrastructure, and diversified power systems are no longer being driven solely by desires to protect the planet. It is increasingly being driven by economics, industrial competitiveness, national security, and geopolitical strategy. The question facing the United States is therefore not whether fossil fuels will remain important. They will. Oil, natural gas, and petrochemical feedstocks will continue to play foundational roles in manufacturing, transportation, agriculture, and global commerce for decades to come. The more pressing question is whether the United States can afford to underinvest in the technologies and infrastructure progressively shaping the next global energy economy.

That question has become especially relevant as the Trump Administration’s second-term energy agenda has prioritized fossil fuel expansion and deregulation while simultaneously scaling back federal support for many renewable and electrification initiatives. Recent Executive Orders focused on “reinvigorating” the coal industry, declaring a “national energy emergency,” and withdrawing additional offshore areas from wind leasing collectively signal a broader policy preference for reinforcing legacy energy systems rather than accelerating investment in emerging ones. While the United States halts or rolls back, its global peers continue to move in the opposite direction, adapting to a growing fuel shortage.

Across Europe and Asia, electric vehicle (EV) adoption accelerates. China has rapidly emerged as a dominant force in battery manufacturing, solar deployment, and EV production. While the U.S. auto industry refocuses on gas vehicles and reports billions of dollars in write-downs on EVs, China has become the largest exporter of vehicles — any vehicles — globally, since 2023. Chinese automakers, which receive government subsidies, rely heavily on speed and consumer nationalism and lean in on manufacturing their own components rather than purchasing them. China dominates EVs on a global scale, outpacing America because there is no incentive for legacy U.S. automakers — an industry that both sides of the aisle agree is historically key for the United States — to build EVs for not just the U.S. market, but every other.

Soon, both Mexico and Canada (which has removed 100 percent tariffs on imported vehicles from China amid the trade dispute with the Trump Administration), will have Chinese EVs available for sale — and that is just North America. Norway now reports that nearly all new vehicle sales within the country are electric, with EVs outnumbering diesels on its roads. The ambitious formal non-binding target to end fossil fuel car sales within Norway by 2025 has effectively been reached. The combination of a realistic goal and stable policy, bolstered by incentive structures, paid off. In the United States, automakers blame an overestimation of the pace of the energy transition paired with lackluster consumer demand, but one could be forgiven for asking: “What energy transition?” Federal tax credits and other subsidies have been repealed for U.S. EV manufacturers, and the United States has implemented 100 percent tariffs on imported EVs from China, effectively banning companies like BYD, Geely, and SAIC. Short-term gains from the Trump Administration’s dismantling of clean air regulations and fuel economy standards are just that — short term.

Chinese automakers such as BYD are developing charging technologies capable of delivering hundreds of miles of range in approximately the same amount of time it takes to refuel a conventional gasoline vehicle. The 2026 Beijing International Automotive Exhibition — now the largest auto show in history — wrapped up in early May, with a key takeaway being how advanced technologies are no longer solely the domain of European luxury brands or higher-end Chinese EVs; the low-price Chinese EV market has made rapid tech strides while staying competitive. These developments are not merely symbolic environmental victories; they are indicators of an increasingly competitive industrial landscape. Trade wars, tariffs, and actual wars create isolationism and erode the international partnerships that have, in the past, helped industries — including the automotive industry — thrive. The global energy transition is no longer theoretical. It is industrial, geopolitical, already underway, and U.S. policy is leaving America behind. Though pandemic reserves of cash exist for U.S. automakers, their executives are bandying about terms like “existential” and “unprecedented.” There are further economic implications — both at the gas pump and for the three million Americans who work directly for the automobile industry. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data show vehicle and parts makers offloading about 21,000 U.S. jobs within the last year despite tariffs designed to force domestic manufacture. While the United States doubles down on its perceived energy and automotive strengths, China — and others — have pivoted to view them as liabilities.

Recent geopolitical events have reinforced the vulnerabilities associated with concentrated dependence on globally traded fossil fuels. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, instability in the Middle East, U.S. policy volatility, Red Sea shipping disruptions, and renewed concerns surrounding the Strait of Hormuz have once again demonstrated how quickly energy supply shocks can reverberate through the global supply chain and economy. For many countries, energy diversification is increasingly viewed not as environmental idealism, but as strategic resilience, and as an answer to the call: “adapt or die.” Distributed solar generation, grid-scale battery storage, electrified transportation systems, and modernized transmission infrastructure offer something traditional hydrocarbon markets often cannot: insulation from maritime chokepoints and volatile global commodity pricing. Sunlight cannot be blockaded (at least until Kessler Syndrome blocks out the sun, or we trend too far in the other direction). Rooftop solar panels are not dependent on tanker routes. Diversified energy systems can, in many cases, improve resilience against both geopolitical instability and physical disruption.

Notably, many countries pursuing aggressive electrification strategies are doing so despite lacking substantial domestic fossil fuel reserves. China’s energy strategy, for example, has long reflected concerns surrounding vulnerability to imported energy supplies and maritime trade routes. While China continues to heavily utilize coal and other fossil fuels, it has simultaneously invested aggressively in EVs, batteries, solar manufacturing, transmission infrastructure, reliable and expansive public transportation, and critical mineral supply chains. The United States, by contrast, possesses abundant domestic oil and natural gas resources. That abundance has unquestionably provided significant economic and geopolitical advantages, and perhaps a touch of hubris. Resource abundance alone does not guarantee industrial leadership in future energy technologies. History offers numerous examples of nations leading one industrial era while falling behind in the next.

It is worth noting that President Trump’s May 2026 state visit to China, where he was expected to discuss trade and technology, specifically critical minerals, included — largely — a delegation of U.S. business executives: SpaceX and Tesla’s Elon Musk, Apple’s Tim Cook, Goldman Sach’s David Solomon, Boeing CEO and President Kelly Ortberg, and Nvidia’s Jensen Huang. Other businesses represented on this state visit include BlackRock, Citi, Blackstone, Meta, Cargill, Visa, Cisco, Qualcomm, Coherent, Micron, GE Aerospace, Illumina, and Mastercard. Trump indicated that market access for U.S. tech companies would be a clear focus, stating that opening up China for U.S. businesses would be his “first request” to China’s President Xi. While specifics were vague, and China clearly has its own priorities, Xi has stated that the door to business in China will “only open wider.” But does the door truly swing both ways? The visit was big on pomp, but seemingly fell short when it came to actual circumstance.

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