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Duane Morris Takeaways: On February 17, 2026, in Paciorkowski v. Jetson Electric Bikes LLC, No. A-1640-24, 2026 WL 438086, at *1 (N.J. App. Div. Feb. 17, 2026), the New Jersey Appellate Division reversed a trial court's dismissal of a plaintiff's individual consumer fraud claims against an electric bike manufacturer, holding that a plaintiff need not demonstrate personal injury to establish standing under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act ("CFA"). However, the Appellate Division affirmed the denial of class certification, holding that an attorney cannot serve in the dual role of class representative and class counsel due to inherent conflicts of interest, reaffirming a general rule established over forty years ago that remains valid today. Id. at *6.
This decision underscores that economic losses, such as purchasing defective products, are sufficient to establish standing under the CFA, while also reinforcing the longstanding prohibition against attorneys wearing two hats in class action litigation.
Case Background
Plaintiff Thomas Paciorkowski, an attorney proceeding pro se, purchased three electric Bolt bikes manufactured by defendant Jetson Electric Bikes, LLC ("Jetson") over the course of eight months in 2020. Id. at *1. Plaintiff alleged that he purchased the bikes for personal use, primarily for vacations, and did not use them for over a year after purchase. Id. He stated he first became aware the bikes were defective over a year after purchase when he went to inflate the bike tires and discovered they would not support his weight or the weight capacity listed on the bikes. Id.
On January 5, 2024, nearly four years after purchasing his first bike, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Jetson asserting individual claims and seeking to certify a class action. Id. The complaint asserted seven causes of action: two violations of the CFA; common law fraud; breach of express warranties; breach of implied warranties of merchantability; violations of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312; and unjust enrichment. Id.
Plaintiff alleged that Jetson made misrepresentations and engaged in unconscionable commercial practices in advertising and marketing its electric bikes. Id. at *2. Specifically, plaintiff asserted four main contentions. Id. First, plaintiff claimed the Bolt had a maximum rider-weight limit of 250 pounds and the Bolt Pro had a maximum rider-weight limit of 265 pounds, but both bikes were equipped with tires that could not support those weights. Id. Second, plaintiff alleged that Jetson advertised the bike tires as being made from rubber when they were actually made from cheaper nylon. Id. Third, plaintiff contended that Jetson advertised the bikes as made from rust-proof aluminum, but the frames were made from cheaper steel or iron that could rust. Id. Fourth, plaintiff asserted that both bikes are illegal to use in New Jersey because the Bolt, being motorized but lacking pedals, should be classified as a motorcycle under New Jersey law and cannot be used on bike paths or bike lanes. Id.
Jetson did not appear in the trial court, and on May 10, 2024, a default was entered against it. Id. at *1. On September 18, 2024, plaintiff moved to certify a class, which he defined as "[A]ll purchasers of Jetson Bolts and Bolt Pros who purchased the products at Costco stores in New Jersey or who purchased online at Costco and had the product shipped to a New Jersey address. The class excludes everyone who returned the product to Costco." Id. at *2. Plaintiff represented that there were 230 potential plaintiffs who purchased Bolts and 4,863 potential plaintiffs who purchased Bolt Pros. Id.
On December 24, 2024, the trial court entered an order denying plaintiff's motion to certify a class. Id. at *3. In a brief written statement, the trial court determined plaintiff lacked standing to bring any claims because he had "suffered no personal injury from the product." Id.
The Appellate Division's Ruling
On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the dismissal of plaintiff's individual claims, holding that the trial court erred in concluding plaintiff lacked standing. Id. at *6.
The Appellate Division explained that a plaintiff can bring a claim under the CFA if he "suffers any ascertainable loss of moneys or property" as a result of unlawful conduct. Id. at *3. According to the Appellate Division, an ascertainable loss is one that is "quantifiable or measurable," and can be established by demonstrating either an out-of-pocket loss or a deprivation of the benefit of one's bargain. Id. (citing Robey v. SPARC Grp. LLC, 256 N.J. 541, 548 (2024)).
The Appellate Division found that plaintiff alleged ascertainable losses under the CFA because he purchased three Jetson bikes for just under $700 and alleged they are defective and unusable. Id. at *4. It emphasized that personal injury is not a requirement for standing under the CFA, noting that the New Jersey Supreme Court has clarified the CFA only allows recovery of economic damages and does not permit recovery of non-economic damages. Id. at *4.
However, while the Appellate Division reversed on standing grounds regarding plaintiff's individual claims, the court affirmed the denial of class certification on alternative grounds, holding plaintiff cannot serve in the dual role of class representative and class counsel. Id. at *5.
The Appellate Division relied on the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in In Re Cadillac V8-6-4 Class Action, 93 N.J. 412 (1983), which adopted a general rule prohibiting a lawyer from serving in the dual capacities of class representative and attorney for the class. Id. at *6. The ruling in In Re Cadillac identified three concerns: (1) the appearance of impropriety; (2) a potential conflict of interest because attorneys' fees are drawn from the fund that also provides compensation to class members; and (3) the prohibition against an attorney acting as counsel in a case where he or she might also be a witness. Id.
Moreover, the decision noted that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit continues to adhere to a per se prohibition against a plaintiff class representative serving as class counsel. Id. (citing Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1090 (3d Cir. 1976)). The court noted that it was unaware of any case questioning the validity of the rule established in In re Cadillac, and interpreted the lack of recent cases questioning this rule as "acceptance of the well-established rule and its continued validity." Id.
Of note, it acknowledged the single narrow exception to the rule adopted by In Re Cadillac, which potentially allows for an attorney to serve as both counsel and class representative in certain public interest litigation. The Appellate Division held that the instant case did not qualify as the type of action covered by the public interest except
Implications For Employers
This decision reinforces New Jersey's (and the Third Circuit's) longstanding prohibition against attorneys serving as both class counsel and class representative. While this may seem to limit class action exposure in situations when a plaintiff-attorney brings suit, employers should recognize that this procedural bar does not eliminate potential individual claims or prevent a class from proceeding with separate counsel and representative plaintiffs.
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