Bifurcation Of Inverse Condemnation Liability Can Be Dispositive Of Remaining Tort Claims

When a lawsuit involves both inverse condemnation claims and other tort claims, trial courts often bifurcate the proceedings. A recent unpublished opinion from the Third District Court of Appeal, Rainey v. Nevada Irrigation District, 2026 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 231, addresses what happens when findings made in the first phase resolve factual issues common to the claims reserved for the second phase.

Background

Two neighboring property owners sued the Nevada Irrigation District, alleging that water leaking and seeping from the District's irrigation ditch caused landslides on their properties. The plaintiffs asserted claims for inverse condemnation, private nuisance, and dangerous condition of public property. The trial court granted the District's motion to bifurcate the trial into two phases.

• In the first phase, the court would conduct a bench trial on inverse condemnation liability.
• In the second phase, a jury would consider inverse condemnation damages and the remaining nuisance and dangerous condition claims.

The bifurcation order explained that resolution of the inverse condemnation liability issue would allow "the Court and the parties to identify the scope of the issues that remain for potential jury resolution during the second phase in light of the Court's findings and conclusions."

The Bench Trial and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

After the bench trial, the trial court found in favor of the District on inverse condemnation liability. Critically, the court found that the plaintiffs had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the ditch's leakage or seepage was a substantial cause of the landslide damage. The District then moved for judgment on the pleadings as to the remaining nuisance and dangerous condition claims, arguing the trial court's causation finding was dispositive. The trial court agreed, explaining that because both nuisance and dangerous condition claims require a showing of causation, the lack of causation finding in the first phase was binding on any subsequent jury trial.

Court of Appeal

On appeal, the plaintiff argued the trial court erred because the bifurcation order stated that the nuisance and dangerous condition claims would be decided by a jury. The plaintiff relied on Darbun Enterprises, Inc. v. San Fernando Community Hospital (2015) 239 Cal.App.4^th 399, which held that "in cases involving mixed issues of equity and law, a trial court may not act as a fact finder on issues it specifically reserves for jury determination." The Court of Appeal rejected this argument and distinguished Darbun. In Darbun, the trial court had explicitly excluded the issue of breach from the equity phase—stating it did not want to hear evidence of breach because that issue was for the jury—but then improperly made findings on breach during a later nonsuit motion.

Here, by contrast, the bifurcation order expressly stated that the trial court would decide inverse condemnation liability—which necessarily included causation. As the court noted, inverse condemnation liability "depends on whether some element of physical, but-for causation is present to link the public improvement and the damage." (Citing City of Oroville v. Superior Court (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1091, 1108.) Moreover, the bifurcation order specified that the scope of issues remaining for jury resolution would be determined "in light of the Court's findings and conclusions" in the equity phase. Reading the bifurcation order as a whole, the Court of Appeal found nothing misleading, inconsistent, or ambiguous. The trial court was acting as the proper fact finder on causation during the equity phase, and its finding that the District's ditch did not cause or contribute to the landslide damage was dispositive of the remaining claims.

Conclusion

Rainey reinforces the well-established "equity first rule"—when a trial court properly tries equitable issues first, its findings on common factual issues will bind subsequent proceedings and may eliminate the need for a jury trial altogether. This case highlights the importance of carefully drafting and reviewing bifurcation orders. The language of the order will determine whether findings in the equity phase are dispositive of legal claims or whether those claims remain for independent jury determination.

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