Supreme Court Weighs Whether Negligent Selection Claims Are Preempted By The FAAAA

On March 4, the Supreme Court heard argument in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport, II, a case that presents an important question at the intersection of federal preemption and state tort law: whether common-law negligent selection claims against freight brokers are preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA). The dispute centers on whether such claims impermissibly regulate a broker’s core services—particularly the selection of motor carriers—or instead fall within the statute’s safety savings clause preserving state authority over motor vehicle safety.

The case arises from a serious highway accident in which the plaintiff-petitioner was injured after his tractor-trailer was struck by a vehicle operated by a driver employed by motor carrier Caribe Transport II, LLC. Caribe had been selected by C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., a freight broker that arranged the shipment. Because Caribe operated as an independent contractor, the plaintiff’s vicarious liability theory against the broker failed. The case instead turns on the plaintiff’s claim that the broker negligently selected an unsafe carrier. The lower courts rejected that claim, with the Seventh Circuit holding that the FAAAA preempts state-law negligent selection claims because they are sufficiently “related to” a broker’s services.

At oral argument, the parties’ competing theories reflected fundamentally different views of how the FAAAA’s preemption clause and safety savings clause should be reconciled. The plaintiff-petitioner emphasized Congress’s dual objectives: deregulating the economic aspects of interstate transportation while preserving traditional state authority over highway safety. On that view, he argued that negligent selection claims operate as a form of safety regulation, targeting the prevention of accidents by incentivizing brokers to choose competent carriers. He argued that such claims fall within the statute’s savings clause for state laws “with respect to motor vehicles,” even though they are asserted against brokers rather than carriers or drivers.

The respondents (the motor carrier and the freight broker), by contrast, framed the case as a straightforward application of the FAAAA’s broad preemption provision. They argued that negligent selection claims directly regulate how brokers perform their central function—selecting and coordinating carriers—and, therefore, fall squarely within the category of state laws Congress sought to displace. Allowing such claims to proceed, they maintained, target brokerage services, not the operation of motor vehicles, and would subject brokers to a patchwork of state tort standards that would effectively reintroduce the very economic regulation Congress intended to eliminate.

The United States, appearing as amicus curiae for the respondents, urged the Court to adopt a structured approach that begins with whether the claim is “related to” a broker’s services under the preemption clause before turning to whether the savings clause restores state authority. The government emphasized that primary responsibility for motor vehicle safety rests with carriers and drivers, not brokers, and cautioned against expanding state tort liability in a way that would indirectly regulate brokerage conduct.

The Justices’ questioning reflected concern with both doctrinal coherence and practical consequences. Chief Justice Roberts focused on how to reconcile the statute’s broad preemption language with its safety savings clause without producing an unworkable or indeterminate standard. Justice Alito similarly explored whether states could circumvent federal deregulation simply by recasting economic regulations as safety-based tort claims. Justice Thomas expressed skepticism that a claim targeting a broker’s business decision could properly be characterized as regulation “with respect to motor vehicles,” suggesting a narrower view of the savings clause.

Other members of the Court appeared more receptive to the petitioner’s position. Justice Sotomayor repeatedly emphasized the accountability gap that could arise if brokers face no liability for selecting unsafe carriers, particularly in circumstances where the broker may have information bearing on safety risks. Justice Kagan’s questioning suggested she was weighing whether negligent selection claims function as traditional background tort rules rather than targeted economic regulation. Justice Jackson similarly explored whether the FAAAA was intended to displace longstanding state-law mechanisms for allocating liability in personal injury cases.

Several Justices also focused on line-drawing concerns. Justice Gorsuch examined whether negligent selection claims are better understood as regulating broker conduct or addressing the safety consequences of motor vehicle operations. Justice Kavanaugh raised questions about how brokers would respond to potential liability exposure, including whether increased litigation risk would materially alter industry practices. Justice Barrett appeared interested in identifying a narrow and administrable rule that would resolve the case without sweeping more broadly than necessary.

The Court’s decision is likely to have significant implications for the trucking and logistics industries, as well as for the broader scope of federal preemption doctrine. A ruling in favor of preemption would limit the availability of state-law claims against freight brokers and reinforce the FAAAA’s deregulatory objectives, potentially consolidating responsibility for safety with carriers and drivers. A ruling allowing negligent selection claims to proceed would sanction state tort law shaping broker behavior and could expose brokers—as well as other upstream non-carriers—to increased litigation risk, particularly in jurisdictions with plaintiff-friendly negligence standards.

More broadly, the case will provide guidance on how courts should interpret statutory schemes that combine expansive preemption provisions with targeted savings clauses—a recurring issue in federal regulatory law. The Court’s approach may influence how similar questions are resolved in other industries where Congress has sought to balance deregulation with the preservation of traditional state authority.

A decision is expected later this Term. Stay tuned for Dykema’s decision alert analyzing the Court’s opinion and its implications for the allocation of liability across the transportation and logistics sectors.