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Across decades of advising multinational mining houses, manufacturers and institutional investors in multiple jurisdictions, our practice has worked on the basis that global minerals markets — while cyclical and politically sensitive — were ultimately governed by supply, demand and capital discipline.
That assumption no longer holds.
Recent developments initiated by the United States, culminating in the ministerial meeting held in Washington on 4–5 February 2026 with more than 50 partner countries, point to a deliberate and structural re-engineering of global critical minerals markets. This is not a tactical trade response to China, but a clear shift away from orthodox free-market principles towards a far more interventionist and strategic model.
For African producers, policymakers and dealmakers engaging around Mining Indaba and AfCFTA, this shift matters not as abstract geopolitics, but as a force that will directly influence valuation, deal structuring, financing models and risk allocation.
The United States' move to establish plurilateral preferential trade arrangements for critical minerals is unprecedented in both form and intent. Unlike traditional free trade agreements, this approach is asset-specific, supply-chain specific and politically curated. It is less concerned with broad tariff liberalisation and more focused on determining who participates in the future industrial economy.
U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer's description of this approach as a “new paradigm” is accurate. In transactional terms, it resembles a club model: a protected ecosystem of “like-minded partners” whose minerals are treated, for subsidy and industrial policy purposes, as functionally domestic to the United States. The coordinated action plans announced with the European Union, Japan and Mexico reinforce this alignment across trade, regulatory and industrial policy — not merely tariff concessions.
One of the most consequential elements of this strategy is the proposed use of border-adjusted price floors. These are not reactive trade remedies. They are pre-emptive mechanisms designed to stabilise pricing by establishing minimum acceptable values within the bloc and triggering measures when external suppliers undercut those thresholds.
From a project finance and M&A perspective, the implications are significant. Price floors compress downside risk, stabilise revenue assumptions and materially alter bankability assessments. For producers operating within the framework, this is not protectionism; it is structural valuation support. For those outside it, exclusion is deliberate and systemic.
Alongside trade measures, the United States has moved decisively into direct market intervention. Initiatives such as Pax Silica and Project Vault, supported by sovereign financing including the recently announced $10 billion Export-Import Bank facility, signal a clear embrace of state capitalism. Strategic reserves and government-backed financing are now integral components of supply-chain security.
For boards and investors, this raises practical questions that increasingly shape transactions: control of strategic assets, interaction between sovereign and private capital, and constraints on exit, transfer and change of control. These considerations are no longer theoretical. They are deal critical.
For African jurisdictions, the implications are finely balanced. Preferential access that allows African-extracted minerals to qualify for U.S. tax credits — effectively rendering them “as good as American” for subsidy purposes — presents a meaningful opportunity to enhance project economics and attract capital.
At the same time, there is a real risk that Africa becomes a venue for competition rather than a shaper of outcomes unless AfCFTA alignment, beneficiation strategies and transaction structuring are pursued with intent. Experience across multiple transactions has repeatedly shown how quickly value migrates offshore when regulatory frameworks are reactive rather than strategic.
For dealmakers, the conclusion is clear. Geopolitics will increasingly surface directly in transaction documentation through trade-eligibility warranties, political-risk repricing, sovereign participation in financing structures, and more complex exit and transfer provisions.
This is not a temporary trade dispute. It marks the emergence of a reordered global minerals economy in which law, capital and geopolitics are inseparable. For Africa, and for those advising at the intersection of these disciplines, the challenge is to move from being mineral-rich to being rule-relevant.
The window is open. It will not remain so indefinitely.
The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.
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