Duane Morris Takeaways: On June 1, 2026, in Andrew Harrington et al. v. Cracker Barrel Country Store Inc., No. 21-CV-000940, 2026 WL 1532921 (D. Ariz. June 1, 2026), Judge Diane J. Humetewa of the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, reaffirmed the Ninth Circuit’s determination that 28 U.S.C. section 1631 does apply to personal jurisdiction issues.
The ruling serves as a blueprint for corporate counsel on jurisdictional defenses in nationwide wage & hour lawsuits
Case Background
Plaintiffs, former Cracker Barrel employees, brought an FLSA collective action seeking redress for alleged failure to pay proper wages. Id. at *1. Cracker Barrel filed a Motion to Dismiss due to the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. Id. A subset of the Plaintiffs who did not continue with arbitration refused to relent, filing a First Amended Complaint asserting that that their signed arbitration agreements were invalid because the Plaintiffs were minors when they signed the agreements. Id. Again, Cracker Barrel filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that the Court lacked personal jurisdiction as none of the named Plaintiffs were from Arizona or worked in Cracker Barrel Arizona stores. Id. The Court subsequently granted Cracker Barrel’s second Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. Remaining steadfast, the Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint adding an Arizona Cracker Barrel employee as a plaintiff. Id. In denying Cracker Barrel’s third Motion to Dismiss, the Court held that the addition of the Arizona Cracker Barrel employee cured the jurisdictional defect. Id.
Following the grant of conditional certification, Cracker Barrel filed a Motion to Certify an Interlocutory Appeal. Id. The Court certified for appeal two questions, including, “[w]hether Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of California, San Francisco Cnty., 582 U.S. 255, 265 (2017), prevents a District Court from sending notice under Section 216(b) of the FLSA to individuals over whom the Court lacks specific personal jurisdiction.” Id. The Ninth Circuit answered in the affirmative and held that “Bristol-Myers applies in collective actions under the FLSA and to that end, specific personal jurisdiction must be analyzed for every individual plaintiff proceeding under the collective action.” Id. In real word application, this meant that the Plaintiffs attempt to cure their Second Amended Complaint by adding an Arizona Cracker Barrel employee was ineffective as specific personal jurisdiction must be satisfied for all Plaintiffs in the collective action. Id. In other words, the Ninth Circuit determined that the District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over the non-Arizona Plaintiffs. Id. at *3.
In response, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Sever and Transfer Non-Arizona Plaintiffs to the U.S. District Court for the District Court of Massachusetts. Id. at *1.
The Court’s Decision
Plaintiffs cited three statues, 28 U.S.C. Sections 1404, 1406, and 1631, to advance their motion. Id. at *2. The Court found that Section 1404 did not apply to Plaintiffs’ Motion. Id. The Court also clarified that Section 1406 did not apply to Plaintiffs’ Motion as the statute is appropriate when making an attempt to transfer a case if the initial court is not in the proper venue. Id. The Court noted that that venue “is not a jurisdiction component” and that Section 1406 is only proper if the defendant moved to dismiss (or transfer) for improper venue. Id.
The Court observed that Section 1631 did not apply to Plaintiffs’ Motion as it “is used specifically to cure deficiencies in jurisdiction.” Id. The statute, however, hinges on a “want of jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1631. All circuits agree that “want of jurisdiction” applies to subject matter jurisdiction; however, there is a circuit split on whether the term applies to personal jurisdiction. Harrington, 2026 2026 WL 1532921, at *2. The Ninth Circuit typically finds that Section 1631 applies to personal jurisdiction. Id.
In the end, the Court made the decision to sever the non-Arizona plaintiffs and transfer their claims to the District Court of Massachusetts because there was a “want of jurisdiction” for the non-Arizona plaintiffs and because the legislative history, plain text, and the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Section 1631 (that the statute applies to personal jurisdiction) allowed for the transfer. Id. at 3.
Implications For Employers
Employers should remain diligent to confirm that personal jurisdiction applies for each plaintiff proceeding under a collective action. This is because attempts by the plaintiff’s bar to retain jurisdiction with the addition of a single plaintiff who is a resident of the location for the presiding court are futile. Further, this decision reaffirms the application of the Ninth Circuit’s reading of Section 1631 — namely, that “want of jurisdiction” applies to personal jurisdiction issues. Companies defending nationwide wage and hour actions should closely evaluate whether transfer motions can be used strategically when personal jurisdiction defects exist, especially in cases involving large groups of opt-in plaintiffs from multiple states.
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